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INTRODUCTION 
In spite of Japan's advanced technological capability, 
preeminent economic strength, and the fact that Japan used 
to be a powerful militant state before 1945, it is generally 
believed that Japan will not attempt to acquire nuclear 
weapons. This is partly because Japan could not defy strong 
pressure from foreign states, including the United States, 
that would oppose its nuclear armament; also partly because 
of self-imposed political and legal restrictions; but, most 
of all because, since the Second World War the Japanese have 
had a tNuclear Allergy' and a strong abhorrence of 
militarism. 1 Indeed, at present these restraints seem to be 
insurmountable, and there are no immediate signs indicating 
Japan's intention to acquire nuclear weapons. 
It would be a mistake, nevertheless, to dismiss the 
possibility of Japan going nuclear in the belief that the 
present restraints will be unchanging and everlasting. As 
William Overholt points out: 
The Japanese are capable of extraordinary and 
extraordinarily rapid, changes of perspective on 
even fundamental issues when the environment or 
their perception of the environment, changes.2 
In Japanese history there have been dramatic shifts in 
policy and international orientation of which its changes 
from isolation to internationalism and from militarism to 
quasi-pacifism are evidence. tAnd once a change in policy, 
or in the phase of the cycle, occurs, the nation tends to 
pursue its new goals with single-minded power.'3 
Thus, taking the Japanese national character into 
consideration together with the fact that Japan has the 
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technological and financial capability, it is difficult to 
deny any possibility of Japan going nuclear in the future. 
Further, if Japan were to decide to acquire nuclear weapons, 
there can be no doubt that it could build up a comparatively 
sophisticated nuclear arsenal within a short period of time. 
This essay will attempt to answer the following key 
questions: What are the circumstances, or at least the 
Japanese perception of the circumstances, in which Japan 
would consider the acquisition of nuclear weapons; what is 
the role Japan would expect nuclear weapons to play; and 
finally, would going nuclear be a wise choice for Japan? 
, 
3 
NOTES 
1. Nuclear Allergy means 'the keenly felt aversion to 
nuclear weapons and implements for their 
delivery ... [This term] was first attributed to 
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles who reportedly 
said in 1954, "The Japanese have caught a Nuclear 
Allergy"'. John E. Endicott, Japan's Nuclear Option 
(New York: 1975), p.91. 
2. William H. Overholt, 'Nuclear Proliferation in Eastern 
Asia' in W.H. Overholt (ed.), Asia's Nuclear Future 
(Boulder, Colorado: 1977), p.156. 
3. ibid. 
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CHAPTER 1 
JAPAN AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS 
1.1 JAPAN'S NUCLEAR POLICY AND CURRENT TRENDS 
Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution, the so-called 
'Peace Clause', is one of the key elements which frame 
Japan's defence policy. It states that: 
Aspiring sincerity to an international peace based 
on justice and order the Japanese people forever 
renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation 
and the threat of force as means of setting 
international disputes. 
In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding 
paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as 
other war potential, will never be maintained. 
The right of belligerency of the State will not be 
recognized. 1 
In spite of the categorical renunciation of war; the 
possession of war potential and rejection of the right of 
belligerency, Japan has a military force which ranks, at 
least, tenth in the world.2 
In view of the Constitution how have such forces been 
assembled? According to the Government's interpretation, 
the first paragraph of Article 9 refers only to 'aggressive 
war' and therefore does not prohibit or restrict the right 
to self-defence. Further, the Government has insisted that, 
since the second paragraph is clearly linked to the first, 
it does not prohibit the use of armed forces for the purpose 
of self-defence.3 It has thus been the Government's view 
that Japan is constitutionally permitted to possess a self-
defence force, provided it lies within the limits of the 
minimum necessary for strictly self-defence purposes.4 
5 
With respect to the tminimum force necessary for self-
defence', the National Defence Program Outline of 1976, 
Japan's current official defence policy, prescribes that 
Japan should be able to cope with a limited and small-scale 
aggression by itself.5 The possession of toffence-oriented' 
weapons systems which endow a country with force project 
capabilities has been recognised as being beyond the limits 
of the constitution. According to the Defence White Paper, 
tJapan evidently cannot possess weapons systems which, from 
the standpoint of their performance, are used exclusively 
for the total destruction of other countries, such as ICBMs 
and long-range strategic bombers'.6 Furthermore, the 
Government recognises that the deployment of troops overseas 
and the exercise of the right of collective self-defence go 
beyond the minimum limit necessary for self-defence.7 
It should be noted that the criteria of whether or not 
the possession of certain weapons systems and the exercise 
of the right of self-defence can be regarded as 
constitutional depends upon both what is deemed the tminimum 
force necessary for self-defence' and the distinction 
between tdefence and offence'. By using this criteria, for 
example, it can be assumed that even nuclear weapons, if 
they were judged to be tthe minimum necessary for self-
defence' and were to be used for that purpose, would be 
constitutionally permissible.8 In fact, this view has been 
stated by succeeding Japanese governments.9 However, it is 
hard to believe that the possession of defensive nuclear 
weapons would be generally accepted as constitutional.10 
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Regardless of how the constitution is to be interpreted 
with respect to the acquisition of 'defensive' nuclear 
weapons, further obstacles are provided by certain political 
and legal restrictions; though these are not necessarily 
insuperable. First, Japan adheres to Three Non-Nuclear 
Principles, which state that Japan will neither possess, nor 
produce, nor permit the introduction of nuclear weapons into 
Japanese territory. Since their enunciation by Prime 
Minister Sato, in December 1967, these Principles have been 
the official basis of Japan's nuclear policy and are backed 
by resolutions of the Diet.11 Second, the Atomic Energy 
Basic Law, which came into force in January 1956, clearly 
restricts the use of nuclear energy to peaceful purposes.12 
Last, in accordance with its obligations under Article II of 
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, ratified in June 1976, 
Japan agrees to neither accept nuclear weapons from nuclear 
armed states nor to be assisted by them in the development 
of such weapons. 13 Further, Japan, in accordance with 
Article III, agrees to permit international inspection from 
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to verify that 
it is not diverting nuclear materials for military use.14 
One crucial question which arises from Japan's basic 
defence posture is that of how Japan's current military 
power can prevent or confront various types of aggression. 
Clearly, it is not possible for Japan, with the necessary 
minimum level of non-nuclear armed strength established for 
strictly self-defence purposes, to prevent or confront, 
without assistance, the threat and use of nuclear weapons, 
or a large-scale invasion with conventional weapons. 
7 
Provision for this is made in the Japan-US Security Treaty 
of 1960 which is the other key document that frames Japan's 
defence policy.15 Under Article 5 of the Treaty, the United 
States is obliged to defend Japan in the event of an attack 
on Japanese territory by armed forces, regardless of whether 
they are nuclear or conventional. 16 With regard to the 
contingency of an invasion in which nuclear arms might be 
used, the Defence White Paper states that tthe U.S.'s means 
of deterrence, including nuclear deterrent power, firmly 
inhibits nuclear attacks against Japan'.17 This dependence 
upon the tNuclear Umbrella' of the United States, combined 
with the Three Non-Nuclear Principles, forms Japan's nuclear 
policy. 
It must, however, be recognised that while Japan relies 
on extended deterrence from the United States, the US 
depends upon Japan in its global strategy. Japan is a vital 
country for the US, not only because of its role as a 
forward base and a shield for US forces, but because it 
hosts American tcommunication facilities, refuelling and 
repair facilities, stopover airstrips, storage depots 
and ... military bases'.18 Because of this, the principle 
of not permitting the introduction of nuclear weapons into 
Japan may be a hindrance to the operational missions of 
American forces in time of war. It is an obstacle for them 
because, according to official statements by successive 
Japanese governments, the word tintroduction' includes not 
only tthe storage of nuclear weapons at American military 
bases in Japan [but also] port calls or landings by U.S. 
ships or planes carrying nuclear arms, and the transit of 
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nuclear-armed ships and planes through Japan's territorial 
seas and air space'.19 
It is highly unlikely, however, that US warships 
carrying nuclear weapons unload them before visiting 
Japanese ports or transitting through Japanese territorial 
waters. In fact, Admiral Gene Larocque and former US 
Ambassador Edwin Reischauer have both asserted that US naval 
vessels with nuclear weapons on 
Japanese ports.20 According 
government interprets the word 
board actually call at 
to Reischauer, the US 
tintroduction' as excluding 
port calls and transit, therefore believing that American 
vessels carrying nuclear weapons can visit Japanese harbours 
and transit through Japanese waters without tprior 
consultation' with the Japanese government.21 
The Suzuki government which was in power at the time 
maintained, like former governments, the official view that 
there was no difference between the US and Japanese 
interpretation of the word tintroduction'. It stated 
that since the United States had not asked for tprior 
consultation', the US must be respecting the Japanese policy 
of not allowing the introduction of nuclear weapons.22 For 
the majority of Japanese people, however, 
convincing. 
this was not very 
Since then, there has been general agreement among most 
Japanese that the US has violated the third principle, and 
that the Japanese governments have tacitly accepted the 
situation.23 In other words, there is little doubt that 
most Japanese are well aware of this particular tnuclear 
fiction'. 
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Despite the strong suspicion of both the US and 
Japanese governments, it . 1S rather interesting that in the 
heated discussion which followed the statement by Reischauer 
a considerable number of Japanese, far from demanding that 
their government rigidly adhere to the Principles, accepted 
the US interpretation of the word tintroduction'.24 Public 
opinion polls carried out by various newspaper companies in 
June 1981 showed that almost half the interviewees supported 
both the port calls and the transit through Japanese waters 
of US vessels carrying nuclear weapons.25 However, in spite 
of informally accepting both port calls and transit, many 
people remain opposed to any formal introduction of US 
nuclear weapons. Their fear is that relaxing the meaning of 
the third non-nuclear principle would lead to other 
limitations and restraints breaking down. While they have 
permitted both port calls and transit, they have preferred 
to keep the nuclear fiction alive tas a lever to hold down 
the rise of the military'.26 
Needless to say, the advocates of nuclear weapons for 
Japan have never been accorded great public support. There 
are presently no indications of Japan intending to abandon 
the first and the second of its non-nuclear principles. 
Nevertheless, the possibility cannot be lightly dismissed. 
In the first place, it is unlikely that Japan would go 
nuclear by taking ta series of small steps, no one of which 
[would] exceed the threshold of acceptance'27 If it were to 
go nuclear, Japan would instead do so in such a way that its 
change of policy would be too extraordinary and rapid to be 
expected. It must be emphasised that, because there seems 
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little prospect of Japan going nuclear at the present time 
or immediate future, this does not necessarily guarantee 
that there will be no change. Depending upon how the 
environment around Japan or the Japanese perception of it 
changes, the minority of advocates for nuclear weapons could 
dramatically grow into the majority. 
For this reason, the advocates of nuclear weapons for 
Japan should not be ignored. In any event, their arguments 
present a case which needs to be answered. 
Who are these advocates of nuclear weapons for Japan, 
and why do they want Japan to be nuclear-armed? 
1.2 ADVOCATES OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS FOR JAPAN 
There have been four noteworthy groups in favour of the 
acquisition of nuclear weapons by Japan: the 'Doyo-Kai' -
an ex-Japanese Imperial Navy group; the tGunji Kagaku 
Kenkyu-Kai' a society for the study of military science; 
the 'Nihon Seinen Kyogi-Kai' a hawkish nation-wide 
pressure group; and a relatively small number of individuals 
from the tright-wing' of the governing Liberal Democratic 
Party (LDP), the 'right-wing' of the Japanese Defence Agency 
(JDA), academic circles, and certain retired officers.28 
This section will attempt to outline the various 
advocates of nuclear weapons for Japan before and after 
1980. 
Advocates: Pre-1980 
In the 1960s when most Japanese were vehemently opposed 
to nuclear arms, it is quite surprising to find that, at the 
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same time, advocates for Japan's nuclear armament were 
making their appearance. Among these advocates, one 
research society and two individuals are worthy of note. 
In 1966, in two articles by the tDoyo-Kai' entitled 
tGunshuku to Senryaku Mondai' [Disarmament and Strategic 
Issues] and tKakusenryaku no Genjitsu eno Kakusei' [Towards 
Realistic Nuclear Strategy], the necessity for Japan to 
possess nuclear weapons for military purposes was 
emphasised. 29 The tDoyo-Kai' argued that Japan, as well as 
other non-nuclear states of Asia, was facing a serious 
threat from China, which had come about by China having 
joined the tNuclear Club' in 1964.30 Therefore, their key 
concern was to restore the balance of power in Asia which 
was, to a large degree, tlopsided' towards China. In order 
to neutralise China's political and military advantage over 
the non-Communist Asian states, the tDoyo-Kai' declared that 
there was no other solution than Japan possessing nuclear 
weapons. In their opinion, it was not wise for Japan to 
depend totally upon the tnuclear umbrella' of the United 
States; the credibility of which was uncertain from the 
standpoint of US intentions. This has long been the typical 
argument of proponents for Japan going nuclear. 
those who have advocated nuclear weapons for 
For most of 
Japan, the 
question of how the U.S. would respond to an attack on Japan 
if that response risked nuclear retaliation against the US, 
has always been the greatest justification of their 
position.31 
Another advocate for nuclear armament was Akio Doi, a 
former Lieutenant-General and head of a military research 
organisation in Tokyo. 
tShinsenryaku to Nihon' 
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In his 1968 publication 
[New Strategy and Japan], Doi 
emphasised that the best option for Japan's security was to 
possess tactical nuclear weapons. 32 His main argument 
seemed to be that while powerful US nuclear forces were 
useful to deter global war, they could not deter regional 
war; for example, an isolated attack on Japan. In other 
words, Doi was another who doubted the credibility of US 
deterrence extended to allies. 
It would seem, however, that Doi's anxiety over the 
United States contained subtle difference from the view most 
advocates for nuclear weapons held. Doi's distrust of the 
US tnuclear umbrella' stemmed not from whether the US would 
help Japan at the expense of its own interests, but from 
whether an opponent would believe or not that the United 
States would retaliate against an attack on Japan which was 
not directed also at the US. Doi insisted that, in order to 
deter an opponent's attack on Japan, Japan itself should 
possess nuclear weapons. It was his opinion that the choice 
of tactical nuclear weapons was in the best interests for 
Japan because of their tcost-effectiveness' and defensive 
characteristics. 33 
The last of the three advocates for nuclear armament to 
be mentioned here was Shintaro Ishihara, a popular novelist 
and member of the Diet, who spoke up in favour of Japan 
possessing nuclear weapons mainly from a political and 
economic point of view. In his 1969 paper tNihon no 
Kakubuso ni tsuite' [Regarding the Nuclear Armament of 
Japan], Ishihara argued that an expanding economic drive on 
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Japan's part would trigger conflicts with other states.34 
In his view, nuclear weapons would enable Japan to achieve 
its political and economic interests in such conflicts. On 
the other hand, Ishihara insisted in another article, 
tHikaku no Shinwa wa kieta' [Disappearance of Non-Nuclear 
Mythology] that Japan's nuclear armament could enhance US 
deterrent capability against the Soviet Union and China and 
thus would be beneficial for the West as a whole. Further, 
in this article, Ishihara claimed that nuclear-powered 
submarines loaded with SLBMs would be the best system for 
Japan. 35 
Advocates: Post-1980 
In the early 1980s, two notable theses on nuclear 
weapons for Japan appeared. One was a paper by the tGunji 
Kagaku Kenkyu-Kai' headed by Ikutaro Shimizu, a scholar of 
international politics and a former leader of the peace 
movement. 36 The Society's 1980 research paper, tNihon no 
Motsubeki Boeiryoku' [Requisite Defence Capacity for Japan], 
stressed that Japan should remove the various tshackles' 
preventing its large-scale rearmament in particular 
Article 9 of the Constitution and the Three Non-Nuclear 
Principles and that it should increase its defence 
spending up to 3 per cent of the Gross National Product 
(GNP).37 
According to the Society, the principal reasons why 
Japan should rearm on a large-scale, including nuclear 
armament, were first, the rapid Soviet military build-up in 
Asia directly threatening the Western allies in the region. 
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The Society argued that the increase in Soviet nuclear 
forces in Asia such as SS-20 Intermediate-Range Nuclear 
Forces (INFs) and aircraft with nuclear capability posed a 
serious threat to Japan. 
Second, since the global military balance, particularly 
the strategic nuclear balance between the US and the USSR, 
is lopsided towards the latter, the US 'umbrella' sheltering 
the Western alliance is no longer credible. Essentially, 
their argument is that, in view of the increased Soviet 
military threat against the allies, the United States can no 
longer give security guarantees even to itself, much less to 
Japan. 38 
In order to cope with this Soviet threat against Japan, 
the Society proposed not only a large-scale conventional 
military build-up but also four nuclear options for Japan: 
(i) possession of thome-made' nuclear 
weapons; 
( i i) 
(iii) 
(iv) 
possession of nuclear delivery systems 
with US warheads; 
deployment of US nuclear forces in Japan; 
and 
official Japanese permission for the 
introduction of US nuclear forces into 
Japan. 39 
The Society's belief is that it is a national disgrace for 
Japan as the world's second largest economic power to depend 
heavily upon US security guarantees. It argues that as long 
as Japan remains dependent upon the US, it cannot become a 
truely independent nation.40 In view of these convictions, 
it is unlikely that the Society regards options (ii), (iii) 
and (iv) which require cooperation with the US as desirable 
for Japan. In other words, because of their anti-American 
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nationalistic stance there is little doubt that their real 
intention is to promote only option (i) for the purpose of 
independence from the United attaining Japan's real 
States.41 They consider nuclear weapons to be necessary 
both for national prestige and to counter Soviet military 
power. 
The most notable thesis on nuclear weapons for Japan, 
however, was that of Yatsuhiro Nakagawa, a scholar of 
international politics at Tsukuba University. In his two 
books, 'Gendai Kakusenryakuron' [Contemporary Nuclear 
Strategy] and tKakugunshuku to Heiwa' [Nuclear Disarmament 
and Peace], he argues for the necessity of nuclear weapons 
for Japan. 
Along much the same line as most of the other 
advocates, Nakagawa stresses that because both US strategic 
and theatre nuclear forces in East Asia are inferior to 
those of the Soviet, the US security guarantee to Japan is 
not credible. With regard to strategic nuclear forces, he 
argues that the inferior position of the US is due not only 
to numbers and improved technology in Soviet strategic 
missiles, but also to superior Soviet nuclear strategy. In 
Nakagawa's opinion, a gross error by US policy-makers, at 
least in pre-Reagan administrations, has been the belief 
that the Soviet Union fears nuclear war more than anything, 
and consequently has adopted the same strategy as the US-
nuclear deterrence through devastating retaliation.42 
Nakaga,a stresses that rather than this optimistic US view 
of Soviet intentions, Soviet nuclear strategy is instead 
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based on war fighting and the ability to survive and win a 
nuclear war against the West.43 
In other words, his view is that although the US has 
regarded nuclear weapons as tabsolute weapons', the Soviet 
Union has regarded them as being able to be used just like 
conventional weapons.44 When comparing US nuclear strategy 
before the Reagan administration, which has aimed only at 
deterring nuclear war without considering strategy after 
deterrence has broken down, with Soviet strategy, which has 
aimed at winning nuclear war, Nakagawa insists it is clear 
that the Soviet strategy is superior to the US's. This 
inferiority in both US nuclear forces and strategy, in spite 
of current US efforts to troll back', leads to a weakening 
of American security guarantees to Japan, and as a result, 
raises the possibility of a limited war in East Asia. 
Nakagawa therefore concludes that in order to enhance US 
deterrent capability against the Soviet Union, the US 
should, first and foremost, in accordance with its current 
hard-line policy, build overwhelming nuclear forces aimed at 
winning nuclear war against the USSR. This could be 
achieved through the development of offensive weapon systems 
such as new generation ballistic missiles and defensive 
measures such as the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) and 
civil defence.45 
Concerning theatre nuclear forces in East Asia, 
Nakagawa argues that the US has no effective nuclear weapons 
system to counter the Soviet SS-20s, each with three MIRVs 
Ii 
I 
~ and a range of 5,000 kilometres. According to him, because 
of a number of weaknesses, US cruise missiles such as ALCMs 
~ 
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carried by B-52G aircraft and SLCMs cannot offset the threat 
of Soviet theatre nuclear forces.46 It would be impossible, 
he continues, to restore this imbalance favouring the 
I II 
Soviets even if the US were to deploy GLCMs and Pershing II 
missiles with a range of 1,500 kilometres in Japan.47 In 
III 
the long run, the most effective countermeasure to this 
problem, he claims, is for Japan to possess nuclear missiles 
with a capacity to attack major Soviet cities such as Moscow 
and Leningrad.48 In response to the question of why Japan 
should possess strategic nuclear capability, Nakagawa gives 
two reasons. 
First, since Japan's survival would be at stake, the 
[ Soviet Union would no doubt believe that Japan would unhesitatingly counter-attack major Soviet cities in 
• response to a Soviet nuclear attack on Japan.49 At the same 
I 
time, since US retaliation against major Soviet cities in 
response to a Soviet nuclear attack on Japan would lead to 
global nuclear war, the Soviet Union might believe that the 
United States would hesitate to implement nuclear 
retaliation in fear of escalation. 
Second, in spite of the asymmetrical damage to Japan 
that would result from a nuclear exchange between itself and 
the USSR, the outcome would not necessarily mean a Soviet 
t victory' . In such a war, the US would probably suffer 
superficial damage, while the Soviets would stand to lose 
many major cities in order to destroy just Japan. Therefore 
the Soviet Union would hesitate to attempt a nuclear war 
against Japan, when considering the disadvantaged position 
it would be left in after war.50 
~, 
I" 
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A suitable weapon system for Japan, Nakagawa continues, 
would be nuclear-powered submarines with SLBMs on board. 
However, unlike Shintaro Ishihara, he argues that it would 
be almost impossible for Japan to develop such a system on 
its own over a short period of time. Consequently, 
Nakagawa proposes that Japan purchases US Trident type 
submarines and missiles as Britain plans to do, or to partly 
manufacture the system under license.51 
Though Nakagawa understands the present US policy of 
opposing nuclear proliferation, he stresses the need for 
Japan's nuclear armament on the grounds that the United 
States alone can no longer enhance deterrent capability 
against the Soviet Union.52 On this point, Nakagawa's idea 
is different from the idea which forms the basis of French 
nuclear strategy. His point is rather that in order to 
enhance the deterrent capability of the West as a whole, 
Japan's collaboration with the US through nuclear armament 
is indispensable. Furthermore, he points out that in order 
to counter a Soviet invasion of Japan, Japan should also 
possess tactical nuclear weapons and deploy them 
particularly in Hokkaido.53 
In conclusion, four crucial arguments by the advocates 
of nuclear weapons for Japan should be distinguished: 
(I) THREAT PERCEPTION 
A common argument of 
weapons for Japan is 
pose a serious threat 
they conclude that it 
possess its own nuclear 
the Soviet threat. 
the advocates of nuclear 
that the Soviet Union does 
to Japan. For this reason 
is necessary for Japan to 
weapons in order to offset 
II 
(II) LACK OF EXTENDED DETERRENCE CREDIBILITY 
It is argued that the US nuclear umbrella is no 
longer credible. While the pre-1980 advocates 
attempted to explain this mainly from the 
standpoint of US intentions, the post-1980 
advocates do so mainly from the standpoint of 
American capability. Thus, one of the 
justifications for the acquisition of nuclear 
weapons by Japan is this doubt about extended 
deterrence. Further, there is the argument by the 
advocates that Japan, regardless of whether the US 
umbrella is credible or not, should not depend 
upon the US security guarantees but stand on its 
own feet. 
(III) OMNIPOTENT NUCLEAR WEAPONS 
The advocates regard nuclear weapons not only as a 
means to counter the threat of a would-be 
aggressor and to deter an aggression, but also as 
a means of enhancing Japan's economic interests, 
its political influence, its prestige and its 
autonomy. It is their view that nuclear weapons 
are omnipotent instruments which would serve to 
achieve all Japanese national interests. 
(IV) CONTRIBUTION TO THE WESTERN ALLIES 
The advocates argue also that Japan's going 
nuclear would contribute to Western security as a 
whole by supplementing American extended 
deterrence. In other words, they justify Japan's 
nuclear armament on the grounds that it is 
beneficial for the Western Free World as well as 
Japan. 
In relation to these arguments, ten crucial questions 
should be addressed in the following chapters. 
Chapter 2 asks: 
(i) What is Japan's security environment and what 
factors are relevant to Japan's security? 
(ii) 
(iii) 
Who threatens Japan and who does Japan think 
threatens it? 
What is the threat perception by Japanese 
'military expansionists' that has been used 
to argue for a large-scale military build-up? 
In order to lay the ground work for assessing 
the arguments of the advocates for nuclear 
weapons Chapter 3 asks: 
19 
(iv) 
(v) 
(vi) 
(vii) 
(viii) 
(ix) 
(x) 
What is the utility of nuclear weapons? 
How feasible is it for Japan to go nuclear? 
Under what circumstances would it do so; and 
What role would Japan expect nuclear weapons 
to play? 
Chapter four assesses the arguments canvassed 
in this Chapter by asking: 
Are the threat perceptions of the 'military 
expansionists' plausible? 
Would the acquisition of nuclear weapons by 
Japan enhance its perceived national 
interests as the advocates of nuclear weapons 
for Japan insist? and finally: 
Would Japan's going nuclear be beneficial for 
Western security? 
20 
II  
~I 
I' 
I' 
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several major cities would see the destruction of most of 
the Japanese population, not to mention its industry. 
Second, as there is no tstrategic depth' towards the 
Asian continent, it is next to impossible for Japan to 
construct firm air-defence lines in order to protect its 
crucial areas facing the Pacific Ocean against an enemy air-
attack from the Continent. 
Third, the fact that Japan is an island nation would 
make an invasion of the major Japanese islands considerably 
difficult.! Offsetting this is the disadvantage Japan has 
in being able to promptly mobilise its forces, spread across 
four major islands, for defence.2 
Fourth, a further significant feature of its geo-
strategic location is that it tstands on the most important 
route linking the Asian continent to the Pacific Ocean via 
the Sea of Okhotsk, the Sea of Japan, and the East China 
Sea' .3 Ships sailing from the continent into the Pacific 
Ocean are dependent on one of three major straits. Listed 
from north to south, they are: the Soya Straits, separating 
Hokkaido from the Soviet territory of Sakhalin; the Tsugaru 
Straits between Hokkaido and Honshu; and the Tsushima 
Straits, which separate the Korean Peninsula from Kyushu and 
Honshu.4 For Soviet naval vessels, for example, continued 
free passage through these Straits is vital as a number of 
Soviet Pacific Fleet bases, including its headquarters, are 
located on the Sea of Japan. From the Japanese and US 
standpoint, Western-allied control of these Straits enables 
the observation of Soviet naval activities in peacetime and 
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the possibility restricting Soviet Pacific Fleet operations 
in wartime. 
It is clear, however, that Japan's military advantage 
owing to its strategic location is a 'double-edged sword'; 
it is precisely because of its location that makes it highly 
doubtful that Japan could avoid involvement in a US-Soviet 
conflict. 
Economic Aspects 
Despite the fact that the end of the Second World War 
saw Japan left in a state of total destruction, Japan has 
not only succeeded in rebuilding its economy, but has also 
won for itself the high degree of prosperity it so 
demonstrably has today. There can be no doubt that in 
industrial and economic terms, Japan is one of the world's 
leaders. In Gross National Product (GNP) it clearly ranks 
as second only to the United States in the free world 
economy. 5 Given that economic strength has become 
increasingly important as a source of 'power' . 1n 
contemporary international society, Japan is the equal of 
the Superpowers except in the military aspects of power.6 
Unlike the Superpowers, however, Japan depends upon 
foreign states to an extremely high degree, not only to keep 
its gigantic industrial economy running but to support its 
huge population as well. Basic materials such as fuel, 
minerals and foodstuffs, have to be imported. In 1984, for 
example, Japan's high degree of dependency on energy 
resource imports represented 83.1 per cent of total domestic 
energy consumption, compared to 11.9 per cent in the US for 
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the same.7 This means that Japan, in spite of its gigantic 
economy measured by GNP, is dangerously vulnerable to 
external circumstances over which it has little or no 
control. As Taketsugu Tsurutani points out, tJapan is 
hostage to events in and among nations that supply it with 
those key commodities without which it would readily 
collapse'.8 
Equally, . ln order to generate a sufficient amount of 
income to pay for essential resources, Japan has no 
alternative than to export its products and compete for 
overseas markets with other advanced industrial states. In 
this sense, Japan's prosperity also depends heavily upon the 
continued custom of foreign states willing to purchase 
Japanese products. It is because of this extremely high 
degree of external dependence for survival that t [Japan] 
must not see security from the defensive aspect 
alone • • • efforts ought to be made from a wider perspective 
which will include the economy, diplomacy, etc.'9 
Neishbourins Powers 
In Northeast Asia, of which Japan is a part, there are 
five neighbouring states which are directly concerned with 
Japan's national security. These are North and South Korea; 
China; the United States, which is not located in the region 
but has vital interests in it; and the Soviet Union. 
Without a doubt, the most dangerous trouble-spot in the 
region is the Korean Peninsula where the confrontation 
between the Communist North and Western-allied South Korea 
has continued for four decades or so. In this area more 
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than 1.2 million ground troops are deployed across the 
Demilitarized Zone (DMZ).10 Although open military conflict 
between the two Koreas has so far been prevented owing to 
the fact that the stability of the Korean Peninsula has been 
the common interest of China, the USSR and the US since the 
end of the Korean War, there is no optimistic prospect that 
the military tension in this area will dramatically lessen 
in the near future.ll Should a major new conflict break out 
between North and South Korea, it is highly likely that the 
conflict would escalate and involve China and/or the Soviet 
Union. Thus, it is also highly likely that, because US 
forces are deployed in Japan, Japan would be involved in the 
conflict. 
Further, if, as the result of a new Korean War, the two 
Koreas should be united, Japan would be faced with a serious 
problem regardless of whether the new Korea were united 
under a hostile Communist regime. A united Korea would have 
the potential of becoming a much greater economic rival than 
the already growing competitive economic power of South 
Korea.12 It can be concluded that in the long term, 
Japanese interests concerning the Korean Peninsula situation 
lie in preservation of the status quo rather than merely 
peace. 
For a decade or so, some Japanese considered the 
nuclear-armed People's Republic of China, with its animosity 
towards Japan, to be a threat to Japan's security. As 
mentioned in the previous chapter, some advocates of nuclear 
weapons for Japan have relied on this perception of a 
Chinese threat for the purpose of promoting their proposal. 
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Indeed, Communist China with its vast land and immense 
population has been an Asian military power with nuclear 
arms since 1964.13 At present, it maintains the world's 
largest army with a combined strength of about 2.97 million 
troops; the third largest navy with a total displacement of 
about 877,000 tons; and the third largest air force with 
about 5,310 combat aircraft. As for its nuclear forces, 
China possesses ICBMs capable of reaching both the US and 
the USSR, and has more than 100 MRBMs and IRBMs, as well as 
a nuclear-powered submarine with SLBMs on board.14 Further, 
it is highly likely that China already possesses tactical 
nuclear weapons. 
However, it goes without saying that such a 
quantitative analysis of China's military forces is not 
sufficient to assess their capability. In qualitative 
terms, China's armed-forces are substantially inferior 
technologically to those of the USSR and the US, and thus, 
its military strength is less than it appears. Also, 
because of defence spending restrictions, it would be 
difficult for China to rapidly modernise its forces.15 
In recent years, the perception of a Chinese threat 
among Japanese has almost completely been dispelled by the 
Sino-Japanese Peace and Friendship Treaty of 1978; the full 
normalisation of US-China relations of 1979; and by the 
unlikelihood that friendly relations between China and the 
West will end in failure in the foreseeable future. 
Clearly, the close collaboration among China, Japan, and the 
US has served to enhance their common interest in reducing 
and offsetting Soviet influence backed by military forces in 
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the Northeast Asia-Pacific region. It is, however, also 
clear that this cooperation, 
Moscow's antagonism to Japan.16 
Union rapidly expanded its 
in turn, has heightened 
The fact that the Soviet 
forces in the Northern 
Territories, an integral part of Japanese territory, just 
after the conclusion of the Sino-Japanese Treaty supports 
this view. 
The United States, as a global military power and as a 
leader of the Western Free World as a whole, has perceived 
vital interests in this region. us interests lie basically 
in counterbalancing Soviet military forces on a global and 
regional scale, and protecting its economic stake in the 
region. In order to support these interests, the us deploys 
substantial forces in the East Asia Pacific region: its 
Army totals roughly 33,000 officers and men in South Korea 
and Japan; its Marine Corps maintains a total strength of 
about 26,000 supported by 50 combat aircraft such as F-4s 
and A-6s; its Navy has approximately 41,000 personnel, about 
70 vessels including three aircraft carriers, and roughly 
270 combat aircraft with bases and posts mainly in Japan 
(Yokosuka), the Philippines (Subic Bay), and Guam; and 
finally the us Air Force has roughly 41,000 personnel and 
about 300 combat aircraft including the sophisticated F-
15s, F-16s and A-lOs aircraft, with bases in Japan (Yokota 
and Kadena), in South Korea, and in the Philippines (Clark 
Field).17 
In" relation to US interests, Japanese Self-Defence 
Forces' (JSDF) role under the Japan-US security system has 
dramatically increased. Since the beginning of the 1980s, 
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the US has been pressuring Japan to enhance its military 
capabilities, mainly in order to deter Soviet Tu-22M 
Backfire bombers from flying over Japan out to the Pacific, 
to control the Sea Lanes Of Communications (SLOCs), and to 
control the major Straits of Soya, Tsugaru and Tsushima. In 
response to US requirements, as far as air defence and anti-
submarine warfare capabilities are concerned, the JSDF have 
been steadily gaining strength as they have come into 
possession of sophisticated US-made aircraft, such as 
the F-15 interceptor, the E-2C early warning aircraft and 
the P3-C anti-submarine warfare aircraft. Moreover, Japan's 
t59 nen Chuki Gyomu Mitsumori' [Mid-Term Defence Program 
1986-90] plans to add sixty three F-15s to the 115 already 
in possession at the completion of FY 1985, a further 
five E-2Cs to the present eight and 50 P-3Cs to the 49 
already possessed by FY 1985.18 
Apart from the questions of whether or not there is any 
likelihood of the JSDF acquiring the capability to carry out 
such missions; and what role the US really expects Japan to 
play, there is little doubt that Japan has increasingly been 
built into US strategy aimed at reducing Soviet influence in 
the region, thus heightening the possibility of its being 
involved in a US-USSR conflict. Such a possibility is 
further increased by the fact that the US has adopted a 
forward political and military strategy, known as the 
'Maritime Strategy'.19 In a US-USSR conflict, one of the 
key doctrines of this Strategy known as 'Horizontal 
Escalation' provides for the US to 'escalate horizontally by 
attacking the Soviets where they [are] weak'.20 This means, 
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for example, that the United States might attack facilities 
in Soviet Asia, such as vital naval bases of the USSR at 
Vladivostok and Petropavlovsk, even if the conflict were to 
have originated and was being fought in the Persian Gulf or 
Europe. In short, since a war between the two Superpowers 
would probably have repercussions in the Northeast Asia-
Pacific region because of the US offensive strategy, it is 
highly likely that Japan would become involved regardless of 
where the war originated. 
The question of whether the Soviet Union is an 
expansionist power or not is hard to answer. It is clear, 
however, that the Soviet Union believes in the necessity of 
possessing military power.21 Since mid-1960 the Soviets 
have made considerable effort to reinforce and modernise 
their forces deployed in the East Asia-Pacific region; 
probably in order to counterbalance US forces as well as to 
deter against China. As for strategic nuclear forces, a 
quarter to one-third of all its ICBM and SLBM strategic 
missiles are deployed in the Far East.22 The Soviet ICBMs 
modernised, for example, in the form of SS-18s with a number 
of MIRVs (up to ten) have been deployed along the Siberian 
railway. SSBN submarines such as Delta III-class carrying 
sixteen SS-N-18 SLBMs, each with three MIRVs stationed at 
Petropavlovsk on the Kamchatka Peninsula are deployed in the 
Sea of Okhotsk which has been claimed as an thistoric and 
internal sea' by the Soviets and from which these ballistic 
missile-firing submarines can attack about two-thirds of 
Continental US nuclear targets. 
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The introduction of Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces 
(INFs) such as SS-20 IRBMs in the region has given a new 
thrust to the Soviet nuclear strike power.23 China, Japan 
and the surrounding sea areas are within striking distance 
of such Soviet INFs. The SS-20 capable of being reloaded 
with a second or third missile is a fully mobile IRBM which 
is carried on a wheeled transporter-erector-Iauncher. It is 
estimated to have a considerably low CEP, a range of about 
5,000 kilometers, and the three MIRVs, each with a yield of 
150 kilotons. At present, 162 or more SS-20s are positioned 
in central Siberia and around Lake Baikal.24 
Today, one-fifth of the entire Soviet ground forces or 
41 divisions are deployed in the region, and are mainly 
intended to deter against China. Soviet air forces in the 
region total about a quarter of the Soviet Union's entire 
air power. The total number of aircraft deployed in the 
area stands at roughly 2,390 with old models being replaced 
by new ones such as MIG-23/27 Floggers and SU-24 Fencers.25 
Soviet naval strength in this region has also grown in size. 
The Pacific Fleet stationed at Vladivostok, the largest of 
the four Soviet Fleets, has more than a quarter of the 
entire Soviet sea power, or about 840 ships including 70 
nuclear-powered submarines and two Kiev-class aircraft 
carriers, with a total displacement of 1.85 million tons. 
Finally, the Soviets have established military bases in the 
Northern Territories claimed by Japan. At present it has 
the equivalent of a division and about 40 MIG-23 Flogger 
fighters deployed at the Tennei airfields on Etorofu Island, 
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one of the four islands of the disputed Northern 
Territories.26 
It must however be recognised that the Soviet military 
build-up in the region had not particularly alarmed the 
Japanese public for most of the period covering the 1970s. 
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan at the end of 1979 
altered this state of affairs. As a result, a considerable 
number of Japanese have come to perceive the Soviet Union as 
a threat to Japan, although the degree of their threat 
concern has varied. Further, in February 1980, the Japanese 
government stated for the first time that the Soviet Union 
was an increasing potential and serious threat to the 
security of Japan.27 
2.2 THREATS AND THREAT PERCEPTIONS 
It is clear that, as Paul Keal points out, tin the 
immediate and foreseeable future the two most likely threats 
to Japan are perceived to be the Soviet Union and dependence 
on raw materials ... '28 
Raw Materials 
Oil and rare metals are crucial for Japan's survival. 
Japan is extremely vulnerable when it come to crude oil for 
at least three reasons: 
(I) THE DEGREE OF DEPENDENCE ON IMPORTS 
In 1984, 99.8 per cent of the 
Japan's economic activity was 
seriously, nearly 70 per cent 
supplied by the Middle East, 
unstable areas in the world.29 
oil necessary for 
imported. More 
of this figure was 
one of the most 
(II) THE DEGREE OF DEPENDENCE ON OIL ENERGY 
Japan relies more heavily upon oil as an energy 
source than almost all the other advanced 
industrialised states. Although the degree of 
dependence upon oil energy has gradually been 
lessening owing to the development of alternative 
energy sources, even today nearly two-thirds of 
all energy consumed in Japan is oil. 
(III) THE FINAL CONSUMPTION OF ENERGY BY SECTOR 
In Japan the percentage of energy consumption by 
the industrial sector is quite high. In 1984, it 
consumed 47.9 per cent of total domestic energy 
consumption while in the US the same sector 
consumed only 28.7 per cent.30 Therefore, any 
disruption to oil supply would create a far 
greater negative impact on Japan's economy, as was 
demonstrated by the 1973-74 oil crisis.31 
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Crucial also for Japan are certain metallic 
substances, in particular the so-called t rare , or 'minor 
metals' which are indispensable for the products of high 
technology industries such as space, electronics, lasers and 
computers. 32 Despite the fact that these advanced 
industries are vital for the future of Japan's economy, 
Japan is 100 per cent dependent upon external suppliers with 
respect to almost all t rare metals'. And that is not all. 
A more serious problem is that Japan's sources of supply of 
these 'rare metals' are considerably concentrated in areas 
of the Southern part of Africa and the Soviet Union.33 
Because of Japan's vulnerability concerning raw 
materials, Japan's security cannot be limited to military 
measures alone, but should include: (i) economic measures 
that contribute to stabilising the political situation of 
the suppliers, such as by providing overseas aid and 
technical assistance; (ii) diplomatic and cultural measures 
to promote friendly relations with the suppliers; and 
(iii) self-defensive measures such as the stockpiling of 
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crude oil and t rare metals'. At the same time, it must not 
be forgotten that because of this vulnerability, any attempt 
by Japan to rely upon tforce' to achieve political and/or 
economic gain would be in vain. 
The Soviet Union 
For many Japanese the Soviet Union is a threat to 
Japan, not only as a global power which could sever the 
supply of raw materials to Japan, but also as an immediate 
neighbouring power building up arms which could be used for 
political coercion or in 
This perception of the 
military action against Japan.34 
Soviets has been stressed by some 
Japanese militarists and used 
Japanese continued low defence 
defensive force structure of 
by them to argue against 
spending; the exclusively 
the JSDF; and even the Three 
Non-Nuclear Principles. The question which arises from the 
perception of a Soviet threat by these tmilitary 
expansionists' is whether or not the Soviet Union is truly a 
threat to Japan's security which would justify the expansion 
of its military forces. In order to answer this it is 
necessary to outline the arguments concerning the perceived 
Soviet threat. 
(I) THE SOVIET STRATEGIC NUCLEAR THREAT 
Advocates of nuclear arms for Japan do not regard the 
Soviet build-up of 
threat. They do, 
strategic nuclear 
however, regard 
forces as a 
the build-up 
direct 
as an 
indirect threat to Japan because it poses a serious direct 
threat to the United States. In other words, it is their 
argument that, because the Soviet strategic nuclear forces, 
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particularly the land-based nuclear forces, pose a threat to 
those of the US, the credibility of US deterrent 
capability extended to an ally which is based on US 
strategic nuclear forces is extremely low. (See Chapter 1, 
Section 2). This is the key argument of the current 
advocates in justifying nuclear weapons for Japan. 
In their opinion, in addition to Soviet superiority in 
numbers of ICBMs, the rapid development of Soviet nuclear 
technology has resulted in improved accuracy, yield and 
reliability. The inference they draw from this is that most 
of the US ICBMs could easily be destroyed by a Soviet first 
strike and if that were the case, could only serve to lessen 
the credibility of nuclear deterrence. 
This notion that the US land-based missile force has 
become vulnerable to a soviet first strike came to be known 
as the 'windowof vulnerability', and was a much discussed 
issue in 1979 and 1980.35 According to the argument, while 
land-based nuclear missiles constitute only one tleg ' of the 
US strategic ttriad' (the other two tIegs' being SSBNs and 
strategic bombers) they possess several features such as 
high accuracy, speed, throw weight (explosive yield) and 
high operational reliability which make them desirable 
strategic nuclear weapons.36 The SLBM systems, on the 
other hand, though having the highest survivability and the 
shortest warning time among the ttriad', do not have a first 
strike capability against the ICBM silos owing to their 
relatively small warheads and high CEP.37 Moreover, SLBM 
systems have an operational problem as they cannot readily 
receive communication from the command and control sectors. 
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And as for long-range strategic bomber systems, though they 
are easily controlled, they are relatively vulnerable and 
ineffective against time-urgent targets. Further, it would 
appear that favourable results could not be obtained because 
of their difficulty in penetrating strong Soviet defence 
lines.3S 
Therefore, if land-based nuclear missiles are 
vulnerable against a Soviet first strike, it seems there 
would remain only two feasible responses to a Soviet limited 
first strike at US ICBM silos: namely 'launch on warning', 
or a SLBM counter attack. Given the high risk involved with 
the former strategy, an actual response would probably be in 
the form of the latter, a SLBM counter-attack. However, 
SLBMs would be inevitably used in a 'limited counter-force' 
role against Soviet military bases, and must be used in a 
• counter-value , role against Soviet cities and industrial 
centres.39 There is little doubt that the former option 
would be ineffective because Soviet forces, such as aircraft 
and vessels, would be evacuated from danger zones at the 
time. 
In the case of the second option, it is probable that 
the Soviet response would be a counter-counter-attack on US 
'value' targets.40 Ultimately, the President of the US 
would have to choose between • surrender' or tsuicide', as 
Henry Kissinger, the former Secretary of State, once stated. 
If there is a twindow of vulnerability', then from a 
strategic standpoint the United States is indeed in an 
extremely disadvantageous position. A 'window of 
vulnerability' would present a grave problem to US national 
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security.41 In this case, according to the advocates of 
nuclear weapons for Japan, the US could no longer give 
security guarantees even to itself, much less to an ally. 
Sea 
The Soviet SSBNs with 
of Okhotsk are also 
SLBMs on board deployed at the 
regarded by the tmilitary 
expansionists' as a serious threat to the US leading also to 
the weakening of extended deterrence. It is argued that, 
while SLBMs are generally regarded as the strategic reserve 
force for the second strike, they would be used in the 
tfirst strike role' in a crisis against comparatively low-
hardened US bases for strategic bombers and SSBNs. As it is 
necessary for the Soviet Union to destroy US strategic 
bombers and SSBNs before they are evacuated from their 
bases, the use of SLBMs deployed in the Sea of Okhotsk and 
capable of a short warning attack would be indispensable in 
an overall Soviet preemptive attack. 
(II) THE SOVIET INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR THREAT 
It is often argued that the existence of the 88-20s 
serves to tilt the nuclear balance between the U8 and the 
US8R in the region towards the latter. The reason being 
that the U8 does not have effective nuclear forces to 
counter them and, as a result, the Soviet Union is seen as 
posing a serious threat to Japan's security. 
Although the US possesses B-52Gs with ALCMs based in 
Guam; carrier-based nuclear capable aircraft; and a number 
of naval vessels with 8LCMs on board which could offset the 
threat of the Soviet TU-22M Backfire bombers, these US 
forces centering on Cruise Missiles do not have the 
capability to counter the S8-20s.42 
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It is pointed out that the reason the Cruise Missiles 
cannot offset the SS-20s is that there are a number of 
asymmetries between them. These include: (i) a short range 
of 2,500 kilometres; (ii) a longer time required for 
retargetting because they are guided by TERCOM systems; 
(iii) a much longer time needed to reach targets because 
they are propelled by turbo-fan engines; (iv) a much lower 
capability for penetrating defence lines owing to their much 
lower speed; and (v) the uncertainty of having US platforms 
in a suitable position when needed.43 Thus it is stressed 
by them that when taking the Soviet threat to US strategic 
nuclear forces into consideration, as well as Soviet build-
up of conventional forces, the deployment of the SS-20s has 
further lowered the credibility of US extended deterrence. 
(III) THE SOVIET CONVENTIONAL THREAT 
With respect to Soviet conventional forces, two 
perceptions of Soviet threat are commonly held. One is the 
perception that the Soviet Union might, in a crisis, conduct 
a surprise invasion of Hokkaido. The grounds on which this 
is argued are, first, that Japan's geographical location is, 
from a strategic standpoint, highly significant. The Soviet 
Union, thinking seriously about advances to the Pacific 
Ocean must regard Japan's location as being capable of 
hindering Soviet naval movements in the sea and therefore 
regard Japan as a grave menace to it. From this it is 
concluded that the Soviet Union might suddenly attempt to 
occupy Hokkaido in order to secure permanently free 
movement. 
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Second, the perception of threat is based on the 
assumption that the Soviets would not believe that the US 
would abide by the obligations of the Japan-US Security 
Treaty and actually respond to even a Soviet conventional 
and limited attack. It is asserted that the Nixon Doctrine 
and the American withdrawal from Southeast Asia created 
Soviet scepticism concerning the credibility of US support 
to allies in Asia. 
Finally, this perception is based on the current Soviet 
build-up in the Northern Territories close to Hokkaido along 
with improved landing capabilities for the Pacific Fleet. 
It now includes the Ivan-Rogov class amphibious assault ship 
and a naval infantry division. 
A further conventional threat argued by tmilitary 
expansionists', is that the powerful Soviet Pacific Fleet 
greatly threatens Japan's vital Sea Lanes of Communications 
(SLOCs). Since the protection of SLOCs is quite difficult, 
particularly with respect to submarines, the Soviet Pacific 
Fleet which possesses about 140 submarines including 70 
nuclear-powered ones is regarded as a direct threat to 
Japan's security.44 
In Chapter 4 these threat perceptions of Soviet 
military forces will be assessed. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE UTILITY OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS 
3.1 THE GENERAL ARGUMENT 
Every government must strive to protect its territory 
from invasion or annexation, its sovereign independence from 
military or political challenge and its interests from 
external threat. Further, most governments seek to expand 
or at least consolidate their political power and influence 
in international relations. These tself-defensive and 
positive goals' pursued by states are tpolitical ends'. 
Most governments have found a military establishment 
not only indispensable for their self-defence but useful in 
supporting their positive goals in the international arena 
in which the conflicting interests and goals of states are 
pursued and disputed. 1 It is believed that the very 
existence of military force can enhance security, engender 
pride in a nation which possesses it, boost its prestige and 
influence the psychological climate in which bargaining and 
negotiation are conducted. 
What role do nuclear weapons have as a means to a 
state's tpolitical ends'? It is clear that because of their 
enormous destructive power, nuclear weapons can not be 
equated with conventional 
chapter will first attempt 
weapons. Consequently this 
to describe the utility of 
nuclear weapons and compare them with conventional weapons. 
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Deterrence 
By threatening to exercise force against an enemy, 
force is used to discourage 'the enemy from taking military 
action by posing for him a prospect of cost and risk 
outweighing his prospective gain'.2 This threat to use 
force can take the form of either 'punishment' - a threat to 
inflict severe consequences in the case of a certain act 
being carried out - or of 'denial' - a threat to use force 
to prevent the actual implementation of an act.3 It is the 
threat to use force that is relevant in peacetime. On the 
other hand, the actual exercise of force employs it not 
only to compel the enemy to fulfill the will of the power 
using it but also to reduce that power's costs and risks 
through injuring and destroying its enemy. In other words, 
the use of force serves to win the war and serves to 
minimise damage. 
With respect to the functions of military force in the 
pre-nuclear era, three features may be noted. First, as 
Glenn Snyder points out, the functions of both 'threat by 
punishment' and 'threat by denial' were performed by the 
same weapons. Second, when war did break out these same 
weapons also functioned as the instruments for winning the 
war and minimising damage.4 Third, because there were no 
weapons strong enough to compel the enemy to submit to one's 
wishes by means of the threat alone, the utility of force in 
pursuit of security was accomplished by the actual use of 
force rather than by the threat of its use. 
It is next to impossible, however, to apply the 
principles of using conventional force to the use of nuclear 
......... 
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II 
force, as the characteristics of nuclear weapons are very 
rl
i different from those of conventional ones. The 
distinguishing characteristic of nuclear weapons is their 
capacity to make targets almost defenceless. Owing to the 
combination of modern delivery systems such as missiles 
which send nuclear warheads into enemy territory and owing 
to their virtually unlimited destructive power, nuclear 
weapons make defence, in the traditional sense of warding 
off an enemy attack, extremely difficult, if not 
II impossible.5 Against an incoming ballistic missile with 
nuclear warheads, no satisfactory tactive defence' is 
available. By this is meant measures to reduce the number 
of incoming weapons, or to interfere with the enemy's aim.6 
And against the destructive power of thermonuclear warheads 
with explosive yields, equivalent to millions of tons of 
TNT, at least as far as the defence of 'value targets', such 
I 
as cities, is concerned, no satisfactory 'passive defence' 
that would absorb those weapons that actually struck home is 
available. 7 Nuclear weapons, as Bernard Brodie stressed, 
1\ 
are the very ones which deserve to be called 'absolute 
weapons'.8 
Can the actual use of such tabsolute weapons' serve the 
'political ends' of a state? Since the principal purpose of 
using force does not lie in hurting the enemy itself, but . 1n 
forcing the enemy to fulfil one's will in order to defend or 
advance (or both) one's national interests, the use of 
I ~ 
nuclear weapons as far as large-scale war is concerned, 
would defeat the purpose of its use in itself. As Thomas 
Shelling points out: 
., 
o 
11 
Not only can nuclear weapons hurt the enemy before 
the war has been won ... but it is widely assumed 
that in a major war that is all they can do .•• In 
the Civil War it [was] hoped that the South would 
become too weak to fight before it became too weak 
to survive. 
For tall-out' war, nuclear weapons threaten to 
reverse this sequence.9 
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This prospect raises the question as to whether or not 
tthere are any stakes which might justify risking a nuclear 
war' .10 
Further, since the consequence of the actual use of 
nuclear weapons against the enemy nuclear power might be 
unprecedented mutual holocaust, it is difficult to imagine 
that there could exist some stake which could force a 
decision-maker to ignore risking such destruction. Thus, in 
the contemporary nuclear era, it has been assumed that no 
rational decison-maker would actually use nuclear weapons if 
he or she judged that there might be a possibility of their 
use bringing about nuclear destruction to his or her own 
society. 
However, even in the nuclear era, it also would seem 
reasonable to assume from a defender's point of view, that 
an adversary might launch a war if that adversary judged 
that there would virtually be no possibility that a war 
would bring serious destruction on itself. Therefore, in 
preparing for the worst, security must aim at preventing 
such intentions by would-be aggressors and some states have 
recognised that for this security goal, nuclear weapons are 
useful. Since there is no effective defence for the 
adversary to ward off nuclear attack the threat of their use 
in retaliation would be highly effective. That is, the 
utility of nuclear weapons for security is to deter the 
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enemy's action through the threat of their use in 
retaliation should deterrence fail.I1 
This threat, however, 'would not be successful unless 
it were believed'.12 To actually deter a potential 
aggressor the threat of retaliation must be credible. How 
can the deterrer make the potential attacker believe the 
threat of retaliation? When considering the credibility of 
a threat, it is necessary to distinguish between the 
'capability' and the 'intention' of the deterrer. 
'Capability' means the ability of the deterrer not only 
to absorb an attacker's first strike without losing 
retaliation forces, but to retaliate effectively in reply. 
It is an essential requirement for the credibility of a 
state's deterrence that it could actually retaliate if the 
enemy were to attack. According to Albert Wohlstetter, in 
order to deter a potential aggressor, the deterrent system 
must have the capability to (i) survive enemy attacks; 
(ii) reach enemy territory; (iii) penetrate enemy active 
defence; and (iv) to destroy the targets.13 Of these, the 
most vital point is (i), the 'invulnerability' of 
retaliatory forces. As there is, to repeat, no effective 
'active defence' against an enemy's nuclear attack, the only 
defence available is through measures of 'passive' defence'. 
These measures include 'concealment', of which SSBN 
submarines are an example, the 'hardening' of targets, such 
as ICBM silos, and the 'mobility' of targets achieved 
through systems such as mobile land-based missiles and the 
deployment of Cruise Missiles at sea.14 
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The means of retaliation are necessary but not 
sufficient for the credibility of retaliation. They must be 
linked to a resolve to use them. Credibility depends 
heavily upon national will if the intention to retaliate is 
to be believed. About this Desmond Ball points out that: 
national will and resolve are functions of many 
factors; the most significant are the character of 
a nation's leadership, the cohesiveness and 
historical traditions of a society, the nature of 
the adversary, and a people's expectations and 
perception of what is at stake ... deterrence is 
in the end a matter of national will and resolve, 
not a function of residual military 
capabilities.15 
However, it must be recognised that there exist 
tuncertainties' in the concept of the credibility. It is 
difficult to judge the credibility of a threat to retaliate. 
There is no quantitative measure of credibility. It would 
seem almost next to impossible for a potential attacker to 
measure, in particular, the level of national will and the 
resolution of the state it contemplates attacking to 
actually retaliate. Thus there always exists the 
possibility of a potential attacker's misunderstanding or 
underestimating the intention it proposes to attack. 
Further, the state deterring could by no means estimate 
exactly how the potential attacker would judge its resolve 
to retaliate. Because of these uncertainties a deterring 
state must consider that its resolve to retaliate might not 
be believed. Consequently, it must always be suspicious of 
potential attackers. In the long run, deterrence requires 
enhancing tcredibility' which could cause a corresponding 
expansion of the forces of potential attackers. Deterrence 
may, in this way, foster arms races.16 
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On the other hand, however, it is often argued that the 
very existence of such uncertainties enhances deterrence. 
According to this argument, if there were no uncertainty 
surrounding the credibility of the threat, the potential 
attacker might be likely to yield to temptation, launching 
an attack on the deterrer, based on its reasonable 
calculation of gain against loss. On the contrary, the 
existence of uncertainty over the credibility of the threat 
would reduce such temptation because it would make the 
potential attacker's war plan extremely difficult to 
implement. Henry Kissinger called this tdeterrence through 
uncertainty' and indeed the uncertainty surrounding the 
credibility of the threat may be indispensable for effective 
deterrence. 17 
In this section so far, it has been argued that one of 
the utilities of nuclear weapons lies in deterring would-be 
aggressors by threatening to use them in retaliation. The 
next step, then, is to examine the kind of 
aggressive actions nuclear weapons could effectively deter. 
Essentially, this is the question of the range and limits of 
nuclear deterrence which has been a central issue of 
strategic thought since the introduction of nuclear weapons . 
It . 1S often argued that the possession of nuclear 
weapons has little or no utility in deterring the aggressive 
actions of non-nuclear states because the credibility of a 
threat from them would be extremely low. To be sure, 
history over the last few decades provides a number of 
examples of situations in which the possession of nuclear 
weapons seemed to have been irrelevant to the prevention and 
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resolution of local conflicts with non-nuclear states.18 
The reason that the threat of use has not been regarded as 
credible is because it has been widely believed that the use 
of nuclear weapons on non-nuclear states would be costly to 
nuclear states. Hedley Bull insists that, in a conflict 
involving non-nuclear states, 'the use of nuclear weapons 
will often be judged to involve a political and moral cost 
out of proportion to the end in view'.19 Non-nuclear states 
would not believe that nuclear states would retaliate by the 
use of nuclear weapons, in spite of the prospect that 
nuclear states would suffer serious political and moral 
damage if they were to use nuclear weapons. Thus, nuclear 
weapons could not effectively deter aggressive actions of 
non-nuclear states in local conflicts. 
It is also argued that the possession of nuclear 
weapons greatly deters any aggressive actions of other 
nuclear states. To examine this argument from the 
standpoint of the size and sophistication of nuclear arsenal 
states possess, it is necessary to distinguish between an 
aggressive action using nuclear weapons and an action with 
conventional weapons backed by the possession of nuclear 
weapons which may be used. 
It can be assumed that a potential enemy would be 
deterred from a nuclear attack on another nuclear weapon 
state, unless: (i) the attacker could be certain of 
disarming the 
(ii) even if 
subject of its attack in a first strike; or 
the attacker could not be certain of disarming 
the other state in its first strike, it could be certain of 
achieving much more than it would lose from the retaliation 
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of the state it attacked. 20 It is also possible to assume 
that an attacker would be deterred from a conventional 
attack, unless: (iii) the state attacking could be certain 
that its conventional attack would not escalate into nuclear 
war; or (iv) even if it were to believe the possibility of 
such escalation, 
nuclear war. 
it could be certain of its superiority in 
The above conditions in which the potential enemy would 
be deterred suggest the following three conclusions. First, 
because even a state with a high-level nuclear armament like 
the Soviet Union could not be certain of meeting all four 
conditions if it were to attack another high-level nuclear 
armed power, 
power could 
it is likely that a high-level nuclear armed 
effectively deter both a nuclear and a 
conventional attack by another high-level power.21 
Secondly, it is less likely that a state with a middle-
level nuclear armament, like France, could effectively deter 
either a nuclear or a conventional attack by a high-level 
nuclear power. The reason such a state would be less likely 
to effectively deter a nuclear attack lies in the 
asymmetrical damage a middle-level power could sustain in a 
nuclear exchange between itself and a high-level power. 
That is, on one hand, because a middle nuclear power's 
survival would be at stake, and on the other hand, because a 
high-level power's survival would not, a high-level power 
might not believe that the credibility of retaliation in 
response to its nuclear attack, as far as a limited nuclear 
attack is concerned, would be high, or it might pay no 
attention to expected damage brought about by retaliation.22 
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Further, because a high-level nuclear power could be certain 
of its superiority even if a war were to escalate into a 
nuclear war, it is also less likely that a conventional 
attack by a high-level power would be effectively deterred. 
Thirdly, it is not likely that a state with a low-level 
nuclear armament, like India, could effectively deter either 
a nuclear or a conventional attack by a low-level nuclear 
armed power, much less by both a high-level and a middle-
level nuclear power. Since the nuclear arsenal of a low-
level nuclear power would probably be composed of rather 
vulnerable non-hardened land-based missiles and/or bombers 
with nuclear load capacity, it would be relatively easy for 
an adversary to destroy such forces by even a surprise 
conventional attack.23 Therefore, far from deterring an 
attack, it is likely that the possession of such a low-level 
nuclear arsenal might tempt the enemy into launching a 
preemptive attack in a crisis.24 
In summary, according to the above analysis, whether or 
not a state with nuclear armament could effectively deter 
the aggressive action of a nuclear armed enemy depends upon 
not only the size and sophistication of its nuclear arsenal 
but also upon that of the enemy's nuclear arsenal. But that 
is not all. It should be stressed that the range and limits 
of deterrence of a nuclear armed state also depend upon 
other factors concerning both a deterrer and an enemy, such 
as geographic features, relationships with allies and, 
needless to say, national will. 
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Coercion 
The term «coercion' refers to the idea that nuclear 
weapons can compel an opponent, by open or tacit threat of 
their use, to fulfil one's will in order to achieve one's 
perceived national interests.25 It should be noted that, 
though both «deterrence' and 'coercion' are performed by a 
threat of use, there is some difference between the two 
concepts. While deterrence is to discourage the opponent 
from doing something such as initiating a military attack, 
'coercion' would aim to compel an opponent not only to 
refrain from military action but also to perform desired 
political or diplomatic actions.26 The concept of 
'coercion' is thus both positive and broader in scope 
compared to deterrence. An example of coercion was the 
American success in the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, where 
the tacit threat to resort to nuclear weapons was able to 
compel the Soviet Union to withdraw its convoy of ships and 
the missile components it had begun to assemble in Cuba.27 
It should be pointed out, however, that because 
«coercion' is achieved by the threat to use nuclear weapons, 
as with deterrence, the argument concerning the range and 
limits of deterrence applies also to that of «coercion'. 
The effectiveness of «coercion' by the threat of nuclear 
weapons depends upon, in the first place, whether the 
opponent has nuclear forces, or upon the extent of nuclear 
forces the opponent has. 
If the opponent were a non-nuclear state, since the 
possibility of the use of nuclear weapons would be judged to 
be extremely low by the opponent, any attempt at «coercion' 
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by the threat to use nuclear weapons would probably fail. 
If the opponent were a nuclear state and its nuclear forces 
were more powerful than those of the tcoercer', or even if 
the opponent's nuclear forces were ton a par' with those of 
the tcoercer', the effectiveness of 
almost negligible. 
tcoercion' would be 
Furthermore, in the same way as in the assessment of 
the effectiveness of deterrence, it is impossible to 
determine exactly how an open or tacit threat of nuclear 
weapons could affect the opponent's actions. For example, 
one may argue that during the Cuban Missile Crisis, though 
it appeared that the Soviet Union backed down because of the 
tacit threat of the overwhelming nuclear forces of the US, 
the Soviet's action may have also been due to various other 
factors such as the lopsided balance of conventional forces 
towards the US in the region, as well as differences in the 
importance of what was at stake for both the US and the 
USSR.28 In short, while, as Bull suggests, there is no 
denying that American threat of force served to bring about 
its diplomatic victory, it is difficult to judge to what 
extent the US nuclear threat contributed to the outcome.29 
Lastly, it must be recognised that, far from being effective 
in promoting the tcoercer's' perceived interests, such a 
positive or an aggressive action of 'coercion' could create 
an aggressive reaction from the opponent. 
Bargaining Chips 
Nuclear weapons 
having a positive 
may be regarded as 'bargaining chips', 
effect on negotiations with foreign 
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states. That is, the development of a certain nuclear 
weapon system, even the decision to develop a certain 
nuclear weapon system, which would disadvantage an adversary 
state, might cause it to make concessions in order to 
prevent such a nuclear weapon system from being added to the 
arsenal deployed against it. 
The development by the United States of advanced 
nuclear weapon systems such as Multiple Independently-
targettable Re-entry Vehicles (MIRVs), has often contributed 
to making the Soviets concede various points to the US in 
arms control negotiations.30 It has at least forced the 
Soviets to sit down at the negotiating table. Furthermore, 
one of the reasons why economic aid from rich Western states 
to India increased rapidly after its tpeaceful nuclear 
explosion' of 1974 might have been their hope that India 
would abandon further development of its texplosive 
device'.31 Against this, it should be noted that the very 
development of such nuclear weapon systems could immediately 
cause an aggressive response from an opponent in the same 
way as in the case of tcoercion'. The fact that India's 
development of nuclear weapons led to the same effort by 
Pakistan in return is evidence supporting this point.32 
Prestige 
Lastly, the possession of nuclear weapons may be 
regarded as a symbol necessary for membership of the tgreat 
power club'.33 Those in possession of nuclear weapons 
expect to boost their prestige because: (i) it implies a 
high standard of scientific, technological and industrial 
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achievements; (ii) it is presumed to increase political 
influence in international society; and (iii) it enhances 
autonomy by securing independent deterrence. However, these 
three benefits expected from the possession of nuclear 
weapons are rather unrealistic. 
First, the rapid progress made by India in the 
development of a fission type nuclear device clearly proved 
that it was by no means difficult for Third World states to 
develop nuclear weapons. 34 Indeed there are a considerable 
number of non-nuclear states which have scientific, 
technological and industrial capacity to develop fission 
type nuclear weapons. 35 Furthermore, among these states 
there are a few which could, within a considerably short 
period of time, develop fusion type nuclear weapons and 
build up a middle-level nuclear arsenal.36 Therefore, the 
possession of nuclear weapons no longer necessarily implies 
a distinctive achievement worth boasting about. 
Second, as mentioned in the argument concerning 
tcoercion', the argument that the possession of nuclear 
weapons can influence the behaviour of other states is 
vague. Even if it did, the effectiveness would be limited. 
Third, it is unlikely that an independent deterrent 
capability could be secured without constructing a 
considerably high-level nuclear force. For example, though 
De Gaulle's tforce de frappe' was clearly intended to secure 
a capability which might provide a measure of independence 
from United States extended deterrence, it is doubtful that 
such deterrent capability by the French middle-level nuclear 
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arsenal could be effective against a potential opponent such 
as the Soviet Union.37 
In short, taking into account these arguments against 
the results expected from the possession of nuclear weapons, 
the insistence that the possession of nuclear weapons would 
boost one's prestige is, at least as far as low and middle-
level nuclear arsenals are concerned, uncertain, or at most, 
an uncritical view. 
3.2 THE SPECIFIC ARGUMENT 
In the previous section, the utility of nuclear weapons 
was considered from four specific aspects: tdeterrence'; 
The purpose was tcoercion'; tbargaining'; and tprestige'. 
to question nuclear weapons as a means to the security of 
states. It was argued that nuclear weapons can have the 
function of deterring would-be aggressors through the threat 
of retaliation. Further, the threat to use nuclear weapons 
can be useful in compelling opponents to commit actions, 
which might include inaction, to advance the interests of 
the tcoercer'. It should, however, be noted that the 
effectiveness of the threat to use nuclear weapons depends 
upon the perception of opponents concerning the capability 
and intention of the tdeterrer' or tcoercer'. In this 
sense, it should be stressed that the utility of nuclear 
weapons as instruments to deter and compel opponents to do 
something is psychological, subjective and uncertain. 
Though it was argued that nuclear weapons can be used 
as tbargaining chips', it does not follow that their use in 
this way will draw the concessions desired from an 
adversary. Indeed, rather 
actions might instead lead 
than 
the 
aggressive action in retaliation. 
which opposes 
of nuclear 
sanctions.38 
'vertical' and/or 
weapons in other 
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secure interests, such 
potential enemy to an 
They might lead a state, 
thorizontal' proliferation 
states, to retaliatory 
Lastly, it was also argued that the possession of 
nuclear weapons can boost the prestige of a state and enable 
it to become a member of the tgreat powers club'; but 
possession of nuclear weapons is not the only qualification 
for membership. Further, although the possession of nuclear 
weapons might inculcate pride in a nation, it will not 
necessarily enhance the state's prestige from the point of 
view of other states. 
It follows from the analysis in the previous section 
that it cannot be unconditionally concluded that nuclear 
weapons are a reliable means to the achievement of national 
goals. Whether or not the utility of nuclear weapons is 
effective depends upon the circumstances in which they are 
used. 
Would the possession of nuclear weapons contribute to 
the achievement of Japan's national goals? Before answering 
this it is necessary to examine the reasons why Japan might 
go nuclear and the role it would expect nuclear weapons to 
play. It is the purpose of this section, therefore, to 
examine these questions from the standpoint of four specific 
benefits expected from the possession of nuclear weapons. 
The main factor which could make Japan choose nuclear 
armament lies in the perception of a long-term deterioration 
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in its regional security position as the result of a 
weakening of US 
depended heavily 
security 
upon a 
guarantees. Since Japan has 
US pledge of protection under the 
Japan-US Security Treaty, a weakening of US security 
guarantees would have a serious impact on Japan's political 
climate. Japanese suspicion over the credibility of US 
support could result from the following factors. 
To begin with, suspicion could result from radical 
changes in the foreign policy outlook of the United States. 
There is little doubt that the events from around 1970 or 
so, including the Nixon Doctrine and the American withdrawal 
from Southeast Asia, the process of normalisation of the 
Sino-American relationship and the trend of detente between 
the USSR and the US, greatly promoted such suspicion among 
Asian States.39 tThe failure of U.S. policy in Vietnam, 
[for example], followed by the announcement in 1977 of plans 
to withdraw U.S. ground combat forces from [South] Korea 
over a five-year period, shook Korean confidence in the U.S. 
security commitment.'40 As a consequence, interest in the 
question of whether South Korea should go nuclear in order 
to independently enhance its own security increased in 
domestic academic circles and among politicians and the 
military. Similarly, signs that the US might break its 
commitment to defend Japan would probably be bound to change 
the climate of Japanese public opinion. But is such a shift 
of US foreign policy likely? 
Japan-US military collaboration has been strongly 
promoted by tHawkish leaders' in both Japan and the United 
States since the early 1980s. Because of the relationship 
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between the two states under the Japan-US security system, 
President Reagan's defence policies have stimulated Japan's 
efforts toward military expansion. During his term in 
office Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone has changed long-
standing policies. He has overseen an agreement to transfer 
military technology from Japan to the U.S.; agreed to 
Japanese participation in SDI research; and most of all, 
achieved a departure from the 1 per cent of GNP tceiling' on 
military spending.41 
Nevertheless, there is a possibility that the 
relationship between the two states could in future 
collapse. This possibility is closely connected with Japan-
US trade and defence friction. The growing trade imbalance 
and mounting US protectionist pressures against Japan have 
become the main political issue between the two states. The 
US annual trade deficit with Japan which averaged US$1.5 
billion between the years 1965 and 1975, compared to the US 
trade deficit with Japan in 1985, which reached 
US$49.7 billion, highlights the seriousness of the 
problem.42 In 
Administration that 
spite of statements by the Reagan 
defence issues should be detached from 
economic issues, 
friction. As a 
strident demands 
sharing' through 
trade friction has resulted 
consequence, Japan has been 
in defence 
faced with 
from Congress for much greater tburden 
increased defence spending.43 Since the 
majority of Americans have believed that Japan's economic 
recovery and growth can be attributed largely to Japan 
having enjoyed a virtually tfree-ride', they have repeatedly 
berated Japan, which is seen as threatening the economy of 
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the very nation that has contributed to its security. The 
possibility that trade friction could lead to a collapse of 
the relationship should not be dismissed. 
Secondly, suspicion over the credibility of US support 
could result from Japan's perception of declining US 
military capability. If Japan were to perceive that US 
military forces were inferior to those of the Soviet Union, 
Japan could hardly regard US security guarantees to it as 
credible. 
Lastly, even if the US government were to adhere to its 
traditional policy of commitment to the defence of Japan, 
and even if US military capability 
sufficient to defend Japan from the 
were regarded as being 
Soviet Union, there 
would remain doubts about US intentions. There would always 
be the crucial question of how the US would respond to an 
attack on Japan if that response risked nuclear retaliation 
against the US. 
These various reasons for doubt could create a 
significant loss of credibility in the American deterrent, 
and as a result, Japan might reassess the value of the US 
security connection and increasingly adopt an autonomous 
defence policy by securing its own nuclear weapons. 
The second factor that could cause Japan to develop 
nuclear weapons is changing perceptions of threat, 
particularly nuclear threat, mainly from the Soviet Union. 
While there can be no denying that for about three decades 
after the Second World War Japanese perceptions of such a 
threat remained quite low, the continuous Soviet military 
build-up, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Soviet 
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nuclear blackmailing of Japan in 1983, have all considerably 
enhanced the perception of a Soviet threat among Japanese.44 
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in particular shocked the 
Japanese and caused debate about Japan's defence posture 
among not only defence policy-makers but also the Japanese 
public at large.45 Makoto Momoi commented that: 
It was a bonanza for Japan's defence circles in 
terms of public relations; the public was awake 
and strategic talks now acquired a new citizenship 
in the Japanese community which had remained close 
to military affairs, more or less.46 
In recent Japanese debate over security, there are no longer 
ttheological disputes' of the kind which, in earlier 
argument, centred on whether or not Japanese Self-Defence 
Forces (JSDF) contravene the Constitution.47 Recent debate 
in academic circles over security has been more argued 
between the so-called tPolitical realists' and the tMilitary 
Realists' . Disagreement is about the extent to which Japan 
should possess armed forces, with consensus regarding the 
need to maintain the JSDF; the Japan-US Security Treaty; and 
the Soviet Union as the obvious threat.48 If this Japanese 
perception of a Soviet threat were to increase, particularly 
if it were coupled with the perception of a declining US 
deterrent capability, Japan might in future decide to go 
nuclear in order to deter the Soviets. 
Such threat perception on Japan's part could also be 
brought about by thorizontal' nuclear proliferation in Asia. 
A nuclear-armed South Korea or Taiwan would alter Japan's 
strategic environment. 49 A nuclear-armed Taiwan, for 
example, might get tougher with Japan in an attempt to 
settle the ownership of islands such as the Senkaku Islands 
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which are the subject of a dispute between Japan and Taiwan. 
Fisheries and the right to sea bed development are similar 
areas of contention. In these cases, in order to neutralise 
the coercive power of the nuclear-armed neighbouring states, 
Japan might opt to develop its own nuclear weapons. 
Also, Japanese threat perception could be influenced by 
disputes over natural resources and overseas markets upon 
which Japan is heavily dependent. 
There is no denying that it will become increasingly 
difficult for every state not only to secure sufficient 
natural resources - because world consumption will continue 
to increase in spite of limited sources of supply - but also 
to expand export markets for manufactured goods as (new 
entrants' continue to increase in number.50 This prospect 
could make Japan, a state extremely poor in natural 
resources and dependent upon exports, harbour a sense of 
impending crisis with respect to securing natural resources 
and overseas markets. Further, since a common global 
framework for effective control and guidance concerning the 
allocation of resources and markets could not be expected to 
be established in the foreseeable future, Japan might 
consider that it could not secure sufficient natural 
resources and overseas markets without having a powerful 
military force to back-up its claims.51 In the long run, 
because Japan might come to regard nuclear weapons as the 
instruments most useful to either defend or advance its 
perceived national interests in negotiations, 
decide to go nuclear. 
it might 
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The third factor which might encourage Japan to 
reconsider its nuclear policies is the desire to make use of 
nuclear weapons as a bargaining chip. The Japanese 
government signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) 
in 1970, but it was not ratified until 1976. Although 
Japan's hesitation over the ratification of the NPT cannot 
be regarded as evidence that Japan seriously considered 
nuclear option at the time, one of the reasons for Japan's 
procrastination may have been that decision-makers thought 
it unwise to abandon the right to possess nuclear weapons 
without securing collateral benefits.52 If nuclear 
proliferation continues, Japan might reconsider its position 
so as to reserve the right to possess nuclear weapons in 
order to use this right as a bargaining chip. Japan might 
also actually develop a nuclear explosive device in the 
belief that reserving the right to develop such a device 
into a deliverable weapon could be used as an important card 
in international negotiations. 
Finally, one of the most crucial factors which might 
provide Japan with the incentive to develop nuclear weapons 
is the desire for prestige. However, by possessing nuclear 
weapons Japan would not expect to boost its prestige on the 
grounds that this would imply a high standard of scientific, 
industrial achievement. It is already, technological and 
and has long been, widely recognised that in purely 
financial terms Japan is quite capable of 
middle-level nuclear arsenal.53 Therefore, the 
technical and 
acquiring a 
development of nuclear weapons would not contribute 
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significantly to boosting Japan's prestige from the 
technical and financial point of view. 
On the other hand, because the possession of nuclear 
weapons is presumed to increase political influence in the 
international arena and because possession would enhance 
autonomy, Japan might believe the development of nuclear 
weapons to be the best way to boost its prestige. Japan 
might perceive its diplomatic weight . ln the international 
arena to be quite low in spite of its high-ranking in 
economic power, and it might conclude that the reason for 
this would lay in the lack of military power. Indeed, it is 
widely perceived that China's possession of nuclear weapons 
helped to force recognition of its 'legitimate' status in 
international society.54 Also the fact that the permanent 
members of the UN Security Council are all nuclear powers 
suggests that nuclear weapons are indispensable for 
increasing political influence. Therefore, if Japan were to 
strive to achieve a high status in diplomacy worthy of its 
economic power, the incentive for nuclear armament might be 
enhanced. 
A further factor is that the natural and growing desire 
for autonomy from the United States, which, if achieved, 
would boost national prestige, might also motivate Japan to 
seek nuclear armament. As with Western Europe, Japan was 
left totally exhausted by the Second World War, but 
recovered with the assistance of the United States. Under 
US protection it was able to eagerly pursue economic growth, 
unburdened by concern with vast expenditure for national 
security. There is no doubt that this dependence on the US 
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yields substantial benefits for Japan.55 However, with its 
success in economic development Japan has regained its self-
confidence with the result that a growing number of Japanese 
perceive Japan to be under American political and military 
domination. 56 Depending on how the relationship between the 
two states changes, this perception could grow and Japan 
might come to resent US domination. Since the achievement 
of 'independence' from the United States would require, 
first and foremost, a much higher degree of so-called (Jishu 
Boeiryoku' [autonomous defence capability] than exists 
today, the possibility of Japan going nuclear might be 
increased. 
In conclusion, this section has sought to ascertain and 
distinguish between the possible motives for Japan's nuclear 
armament and consider the role Japan might expect nuclear 
weapons to play. Though it is difficult to identify the 
motives and expectations of Japan, partly because they are 
not only subjective but also compound, and partly because 
they can change quickly, the foregoing are the most likely. 
The question of whether or not the probability of 
Japan's going nuclear will be high in the foreseeable future 
is difficult to judge. Nevertheless, it would be a mistake 
to lightly dismiss the possibility. It is, for example, 
often argued that Japan's 
because of the firm US 
nuclear armament is not feasible 
nuclear proliferation. 
policy of 
The US might 
opposing (horizontal' 
nevertheless expect 
Japan to supplement its deterrent capability were it to 
perceive a deterioration in the credibility of us 
deterrence. Apart from this, serious friction as in current 
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trade problems between the two states could cause the 
relationship 
collapse. 
between 
If this 
Japan and the United States to 
happened, US restraint on Japan's going 
nuclear would be drastically reduced, thus enhancing the 
motives for nuclear armament. 
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CHAPTER 4 
AN ASSESSMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS FOR JAPAN 
4.1 JAPANESE NUCLEAR WEAPONS AS INSTRUMENTS FOR DETERRENCE 
In the second chapter it was stated that the Soviet 
Union is currently perceived to be the potential enemy by 
most Japanese proponents for increased armaments and will be 
so in the foreseeable future. According to the advocates of 
nuclear weapons for Japan, the rapid Soviet military build-
up, particularly in the 1980s, has posed a serious threat to 
Japanese security and Japan should therefore possess nuclear 
weapons to deter any aggressive Soviet action. 
Would Japanese nuclear weapons be useful or effective 
in deterring the Soviets? 
Before attempting to answer this question, it is 
necessary to examine whether or not one of the key premises 
of advocates for nuclear weapons is plausible; is there a 
Soviet military threat serious enough to justify nuclear 
weapons for Japan? 
This section will attempt to assess, in the first 
place, the perception of the Soviet threat held by the 
proponents of nuclear weapons. 
Assessment of the Soviet Threat 
(I) THE SOVIET STRATEGIC NUCLEAR THREAT 
The key argument of the current advocates attempting to 
justify nuclear weapons for Japan is that, because the 
Soviet land-based nuclear force poses a serious threat to 
that of the US, the credibility of US extended deterrence as 
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a guarantee of Japan's security is extremely low. 
Chapter 2}. 
(See 
It is considered possible to calculate the probability 
of a weapon's destroying a target, given that its hardness 
is known, by using estimates of the CEP, the explosive yield 
and the reliability of the weapon used.1 For instance, the 
Soviet MIRVed SS-18 Mod 4 is estimated to have a CEP of 250 
metres, and each of its ten warheads has a yield of 550 
kilotons.2 Assuming 100 per . cent reliability, this 
calculation would indicate that 2,000 Soviet warheads could 
destroy nearly 90 per cent of the total US Minuteman missile 
force in its silos.3 However, when estimating the 
probability of destroying targets, calculations like the 
above are misleading in that they make no mention of a 
number of substantial uncertainties that exist in such an 
attack.4 There is, for example, uncertainty about the 
estimate of the CEP, the explosive yield and the reliability 
(the assumption of perfect reliability is unreasonable) 
because of a statistically insufficient number of tests and 
the difficulty of carrying out such tests under realistic 
conditions.5 Furthermore, it is almost impossible to 
predict what influence weather conditions in the enemy's 
territory would have on warheads or what influence the so-
called tfratricide' effect would have on the outcome.6 
Perhaps the biggest uncertainty of all, at least from the 
attackers' standpoint, lies in the hardness of the silos to 
be attacked. Therefore, an attack by the Soviet Union would 
probably result in the more realistic figure of between a 
50 per cent - 90 per cent destruction of the US ICBM force.7 
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It is probable that for the decision-makers of the Soviets, 
the US does not have a window of vulnerability jeopardising 
its ICBM force. 
In addition to these technological uncertainties, 
Soviet decision-makers twould have to consider a host of 
other uncertainties, mainly centering on the reaction of 
[the United States] under attack'.8 Needless to say, it 
would be next to impossible for the Soviets to have any 
confidence that the United States would implement to neither 
launch its ICBMs ton warning' or tunder attack', nor to 
immediately launch its SLBMs to Soviet tvalue-targets' . ln 
response to a 80viet preemptive attack on US ICBM force. 
With substantial uncertainties lessening confidence in the 
outcome of a nuclear attack and realising the immense 
destruction a nuclear war would bring, it is highly 
improbable that the Soviet Union would choose to attempt a 
first-strike at US ICBM silos. In that case, the Soviet 
SLBM force in the Sea of Okhotsk which has merely 'limited 
counter-force role' capability is not necessarily a serious 
threat to the United States. 
In conclusion, the key argument of those justifying 
nuclear weapons for Japan appears to be unconvincing. 
(II) THE SOVIET INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR THREAT 
Concerning the interpretation of the Soviet INF force, 
three opposing arguments may be distinguished. 
First, the 88-20s would appear to be partly aimed at 
China. This means that the number of Soviet S8-20s out of 
approximately 162 deployed in the region can be regarded as 
being tevenly balanced' with the number of Chinese IRBMs.9 
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Second, it would appear that the Soviet Union has 
deployed the SS-20s in the region partly in order to 
increase its political influence. The Soviet nuclear 
blackmail in 1983 which attempted to force Japan to decouple 
itself from the US displayed how such nuclear weapons can 
serve the Soviet's political aim. In that case, the threat 
of the SS-20s is not worth special mention because it is not 
credible. (See Chapter 3). 
Third, the deployment of US SLCMs, far from being 
unable to offset the threat of the SS-20s, tilts the balance 
of INFs between the US and the Soviets towards the former. 
There are three reasons for this: (i) US SLCMs can easily 
be concealed and can be deployed on submarines; (ii) it is 
impossible for the Soviets to distinguish nuclear from 
conventional versions of the SLCM; and (iii) the number of 
SLCMs being deployed are intended to complicate Soviet 
battle planning.10 SLCMs fly at a relatively low speed, but 
it is quite difficult to detect them in flight because of 
their small size and penetration at low altitudes.11 
Moreover, their considerably low CEP of about 50 metres 
enables them to destroy Soviet hardened targets. 
It can be concluded then, that the United States 
threatens the Soviet Union more than the Soviets threatens 
the US and Japan through the deployment of the SS-20s. 
(III) SOVIET CONVENTIONAL THREAT 
Four counter-arguments can be set against the 
interpretation of the threat of Soviet conventional forces. 
To begin with, Soviet invasion of Japan, regardless of 
its scale, would escalate to large-scale war. The US would 
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respond probably not out of duty to fulfil its legal 
obligations based on the Japan-US Security Treaty, but 
because of the disadvantages of losing Japan. Further, such 
a Soviet attack, needless to say, would inevitably create 
enormous international criticism of the Soviet's behaviour. 
Any Soviet attack on Japan is highly unlikely except in the 
context of a US-Soviet conflict. 
Secondly, the primary role of the Pacific Fleet appears 
to be to protect the Soviet SLBM force. In other words, the 
primarily role of the Soviet Fleet can be regarded as being 
defensive.12 
Thirdly, it is not necessarily an easy mission for the 
Soviet forces in the region to launch an invasion of even 
Hokkaido. The Soviet Union would need to muster forces of 
at least several divisions and vast maritime and air assets 
in order to land on and secure Hokkaido. This mission would 
probably require mobilisation of a part of Soviet forces 
deployed at the Sino-Soviet border, which would inevitably 
weaken Soviet defences against China. 
Lastly, it would appear that the Soviet military build-
up in Northern Territories has been primarily motivated both 
by the defensive military aim of protecting Soviet 
submarines in the Sea of Okhotsk and the political aim of 
protesting against the development of the Sino-Japanese 
collaboration. 13 
In summary, it can be concluded that though a Soviet 
military threat does exist in the region, there is not 
enough of a serious aggressive threat to justify Japan's 
large-scale rearmament, much less its nuclear armament. 
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Against this view, however, those who support Japan's heavy 
military build-up, including nuclear weapons for Japan, may 
insist that, even if it is true that the nature of Soviet 
threat can be interpreted in a number of ways, it is wise 
for Japan to be prepared for the worst. This Cworst case' 
thinking is a favourite ploy of the Cmilitary expansionists' 
to promote an increase in defence expenditure. Obviously, 
decision-makers and defence planners should avoid an overly 
optimistic view of potential enemies. If, however, it is 
assumed that there does exist a serious Soviet threat to 
Japan, then would Japan's possession of nuclear weapons 
contribute to the enhancement of its security? 
Assessment of Japanese Nuclear Weapons as Instruments for 
Deterrence 
As the next step, this section will assess whether or 
not nuclear weapons could deter aggressive Soviet action. 
According to the previous analyses, one of the decisive 
factors which could cause Japan to develop nuclear weapons 
is Japanese suspicion of the credibility of US security 
guarantees coupled with the perception of an increasing 
Soviet threat. Under these circumstances Japan might 
reassess the value of its US security connection and go 
nuclear, aiming to deter the Soviets without depending upon 
US extended deterrence. 
This aim requires the possession of a deterrent system 
which not only has the ability to absorb a Soviet first 
strike but is still able to retaliate effectively in reply. 
When taking into account Japan's crucial geographical 
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features such as lack of strategic depth and the fact that 
Japan is close to Soviet territory, both long-range bombers 
and land-based ballistic missiles would be vulnerable to a 
Soviet first strike. Further, strategic bombers would not 
be a suitable deterrent force for Japan because it would be 
extremely difficult to penetrate the strong Soviet air 
defence lines and attack major targets, the majority of 
which are located quite far from Japanese territory. In the 
long run, as Ishihara and Nakagawa point out, it can be 
concluded that the most suitable option for its deterrent 
force would be to develop nuclear-powered submarines 
carrying ballistic missiles, mainly because of their high 
survivability. 14 Though there is no denying that it would 
not be easy to realise this option, in developing various 
systems to form a SLBM deterrent force Japan could build on 
experience and facilities acquired in the following fields. 
(I) CIVIL NUCLEAR ENERGY 
The fact that the percentage occupied by nuclear 
power generation of Japan's total electricity 
generation was 22.9 per cent in 1985, clearly 
suggests that Japan is one of the leading nations 
in the field of civil nuclear energy. Moreover, 
Japan is in the process of acquiring its own 
enrichment and reprocessing technologies which 
would be able to produce the enriched uranium and 
the plutonium for nuclear weapons.15 
(II) NUCLEAR-POWERED SHIPS 
Japan has had experience in building a nuclear-
powered ship, the Mutsu, in the late 1960s. 
Though this first, and so far only, nuclear ship 
program ended in failure, the Japanese have 
presumably learned from it, especially having 
developed a nuclear-powered propulsion system 
applicable to use on submarines.16 
(III) NAVAL SUBMARINES 
Japanese heavy industry has the capacity to build 
modern submarines. In fact, the total number of 
submarines launched by Japan's heavy industry as 
of 1984 was fourteen, including twelve teardrop-
shaped ones, for Japan's Maritime Self-Defence 
Force. The new and powerful five Yushio type 
submarines are probably on a par with the best of 
the world's non-nuclear-powered submarines.17 
(IV) SPACE DEVELOPMENT 
As of March 1985, the total number of satellites 
launched by Japanese launching vehicles, which 
were mainly solid-propellant rockets and 
consequently more suitable for SLBMs, was 27 
including eight geostationary satellites.18 While 
it is true that Japan does not have the technology 
for a sophisticated inertial guidance system to 
make ballistic missiles accurately hit the target, 
Japan's SLBMs would not necessarily be required to 
be equipped with a high accuracy guidance system 
because their mission would primarily be to 
retaliate against the enemy's tsoft-targets'. 
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Therefore, it can be concluded that if Japan, with ample 
national resources and manpower, were to decide to develop a 
deterrent system of nuclear-powered submarines armed with 
nuclear ballistic missiles, it might be able to do so within 
a comparatively short period of time. Furthermore, when 
considering Japanese high-technology capacity in the fields 
of, for example, computers and communication, Japan could 
also develop sophisticated Command, Control and 
Communication systems indispensable for nuclear missions.19 
However, it is doubtful that an independent Japanese 
SLBM force could effectively deter a Soviet aggressive 
action because of the following two reasons. 
As Nakagawa insists, the Soviets would believe that 
Japan would retaliate against major Soviet cities, without 
hesitation, in response to a Soviet nuclear attack on Japan, 
as far as an overall attack is concerned. Indeed, in spite 
of projected asymmetrical damage favourable to the USSR in 
an overall exchange between the two states, the Soviets 
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might regard damage to major cities as being unacceptable in 
the context of its continuing competition with the United 
States.20 Therefore, it is possible that Japan's SLBM force 
might be able to deter an overall Soviet nuclear attack on 
Japan. However, in the first place, this 
overall Soviet strike is extremely unlikely 
such an attack would inevitably lead 
scenario of an 
because while 
to Japanese 
retaliation, as already mentioned, the Soviets could, on the 
other hand, 
attack. 
force Japan to submit by a much more limited 
If the Soviet Union, as the first step, were to 
implement a limited attack on tforce-targets' on Japanese 
soil, there is little doubt that because of Japan's lack of 
strategic depth as well as a relatively small number of non-
hardened military bases, the Soviet Union could destroy them 
with a tsingle blow'. Given such a situation, would Japan 
immediately launch its SLBMs at Soviet tvalue-targets'? It 
is probable, apart from the question of whether or not 
Japan's SLBM force could effectively execute ' such an 
operation, that Japan would decide to implement a counter-
attack on Soviet tforce targets' at first, fearing that its 
tcounter-value' retaliation would inevitably lead to 
escalation. But to what extent should Japan retaliate? 
When taking the large number of relatively protected Soviet 
military targets into consideration, a retaliative Ccounter-
force attack' by Japan to roughly the same degree of damage 
it received would be meaningless. On the other hand, a 
Ccounter-attack' by Japan beyond the same degree of damage 
would inevitably lead to further escalation.21 
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If the Soviets, as the tNth' step, after mutual 
'counter-force' nuclear exchanges between the two states, 
were to launch several missiles directed at tvalue-targets' 
like Osaka in which about 2.1 per cent of the Japanese 
population live (i.e. 2.5 million), how would Japan respond? 
Japan might retaliate against Kiev of almost the same 
population. However, it is probable that the importance of 
Osaka for Japan is not equivalent to the importance of the 
capital of the Ukraine for the USSR which is only one of the 
Republics comprising the Soviet Union. The percentage 
occupied by the population of Kiev is only 0.9 per cent of 
the total Soviet population. For Japan to expect to 
eliminate about 2 per cent of the Soviet population, it 
would have to attack a few more capital cities of Soviet 
Republics with considerably more missiles than would be used 
by a Soviet attack on Osaka. 
If, after the tNth' mutual nuclear exchange, the 
Soviets were to decide to further escalate and include Tokyo 
and its environs inhabited by one fourth of the Japanese 
population, how would Japan react? In order to retaliate 
against 25 per cent of the Soviet population, Japan would 
have to attack about 100 major cities including Moscow and 
Leningrad. 22 If Japan were able to accomplish this it would 
precipitate an unprecedented Soviet counter-attack on Japan 
eliminating almost all the Japanese. 
It is clear that because an all-out exchange would 
leave the Soviets in a disadvantaged position after the war, 
the USSR would try to avoid it as much as possible. 
However, is it likely that Japan would ascend the 'ladder' 
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of escalation to the point of all-out exchange? Far from 
ascending the 'ladder' to that point, it is doubtful that 
Japan would go up even one 'rung' in response to a Soviet 
limited attack. Since asymmetrical damage would be incurred 
at every stage of escalation, with the Soviets always able 
to hold 'escalation dominance', it . 1.S likely that Japan 
could not but discontinue the 'escalation' and immediately 
surrender to the USSR. Unfavourable asymmetrical damage to 
Japan would essentially be brought about by Japan's 
geographical circumstances rather than by the imbalance of 
nuclear forces between the two states and could not be 
improved even if Japan were to acquire a high-level nuclear 
arsenal. Figuratively speaking, Japan's ascension of the 
'ladder' of escalation could well be likened to Japan 
increasing its gambling money in a poker game in which the 
outcome is obvious. In short, it is remote that the Soviet 
Union would regard Japan's intention of retaliation 1.n 
response to a Soviet limited nuclear attack on Japan as 
being credible. 
The other reason why Japan's SLBM deterrent force would 
not be credible lies in the vulnerability of the Japanese 
Command, Control and Communication systems to the enemy's 
attack.23 The Soviet Union would implement a surprise 
attack aiming at these Japanese facilities by launching 
SLBMs from the sea off Japan, or by releasing air-launched 
missiles from bombers close to Japan. That is, since the 
Soviets could promptly and accurately hit the Japanese 
targets, there is little doubt that the USSR could 
'decapitate' Japan and, as a result, in spite of the 
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prospect that Japan's SLBM force would remain intact, Japan 
would probably be compelled to surrender to the USSR without 
having had the chance to command its submarines to fire any 
missiles at the Soviet Union. Therefore, Japan might not be 
able to avoid adopting the strategy of (Launch-On-Warning' 
which would increase the possibility of war by 
inadvertence. 24 
For these reasons it can be concluded that an 
independent Japanese nuclear force would lower the 
crediblity necessary to deter a Soviet limited attack. And 
that is not all. There is no doubt that Japan's decision to 
build a nuclear force would only serve to heighten the 
tension which already exists between the two states. Given 
such a situation, it is possible that the Soviet Union might 
apply strong pressure on Japan to force it to give up such a 
plan, or the Soviets might decide to implement a 
preventative attack on Japan to forestall aggressive 
Japanese actions. 
So far, this section has attempted to assess the 
likelihood of Japanese nuclear forces achieving an 
autonomous deterrent capability. A further question . 1S 
whether Japanese nuclear forces under much stronger Japan-US 
military collaboration that exists today would be profitable 
for the security of Japan, or both. In this case, there can 
be no doubt that the possibility of a Soviet isolated attack 
on Japan would be extremely low, because such an attack 
would in all possibility bring in the United States. 
Furthermore, as Nakagawa proposes, it is possible that the 
US might agree to sell US advanced SSBN systems to Japan, or 
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might allow Japan to manufacture them under license.25 If 
Nakagawa's proposal were to be realised, Japan might be able 
to not only save energy but, more than anything, avoid 
passing through ta long danger period' during which the 
Soviets might implement a preventative attack. There could, 
however, be no certainty that this would be any more 
successful in enhancing Japan's national security. 
In the first place, even if Japan were not to possess a 
nuclear force, there is a remote possibility that Japan, 
under the Japan-US security system, would sustain a Soviet 
isolated attack. Therefore, if Japan's aim for nuclear 
armament were merely to deter such a Soviet attack, there 
would not be any need for Japan to go nuclear. 
Secondly, when taking into account the unavoidable 
vulnerability of Japan's deterrent force, two probabilities 
can be pointed out. On the one hand, it is unlikely that 
such a Japanese nuclear force would enhance the US nuclear 
umbrella over the Northeast Pacific region. On the other 
hand, in a crisis between the Soviets and the Japan-US 
military alliance, the Soviet Union might carry out a 
preventative attack on Japan, fearing that Japan might 
implement a preemptive attack on the Soviets before the 
Soviet Union could destroy Japan's vulnerable nuclear 
forces. 
Third, at the same time as Japanese nuclear forces 
would be unlikely to effectively reinforce US extended 
deterrent capability, it would cause catastrophic results 
for Japan if deterrence were to fail. It is likely that 
Japan would shoulder a much more important role as an 
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advance base of the United States under a Japan-US nuclear 
collaboration. In this circumstance, if a US-Soviet 
conflict were to break out, what would happen to Japan? 
Indeed, there is little doubt that Japan, under the Japan-US 
security system, could not avoid being involved in such a 
conflict even without possession of a nuclear force. 
If, however, Japan attempted to collaborate on nuclear 
strategy with the US through nuclear armament, a US-USSR 
conflict might bring about damage to Japan so severe that it 
could not recover. The Soviets would probably attack a 
number of Japan-US targets on Japanese soil such as tnuclear 
forces' , 
political 
'conventional 
leadership' 
military forces', 
and teconomic 
'military and 
and industrial 
targets'.26 In particular, the Soviets might implement a 
nuclear attack on the nuclear forces and military and 
political leadership because these targets need to be 
promptly and assuredly destroyed. Furthermore, there is no 
denying that it would be much easier for the USSR to decide 
to use nuclear weapons against a nuclear-armed Japan than 
against a non-nuclear-armed Japan. 
In short, Nakagawa's proposal for Japan-US nuclear 
collaboration outlined in the first chapter would not be 
useful in enhancing nuclear deterrence in the region and 
what is worse, it would threaten Japan's survival in itself 
if a US-USSR war were to break out. Furthermore, it should 
be noted that Japan-US nuclear collaboration would only 
serve to enhance American political and military domination 
over Japan. 
90 
The preceding arguments support the conclusion that 
neither a Japanese nuclear deterrent force for autonomous 
defence, nor a Japanese nuclear force under Japan-US nuclear 
collaboration would enhance Japan's national security. On 
the contrary, possession of nuclear weapons would ultimately 
lead to an increase in crises involving Japan. 
4.2 JAPANESE NUCLEAR WEAPONS AS INSTRUMENTS FOR COERCION, 
BARGAINING CHIPS AND PRESTIGE 
It has been argued by the advocates of nuclear weapons 
for Japan that a Japanese nuclear force could contribute 
not only to deterring would-be aggressors but to achieving 
other national goals. That the effectiveness of Japanese 
nuclear weapons as instruments for deterrence is extremely 
doubtful has been shown by the preceding analysis. How 
should the benefit for other goals be assessed? Would 
Japanese nuclear weapons be useful as instruments for 
'coercion', 'bargaining chips' and (prestige' in advancing 
perceived national interests? There are several reasons for 
believing they would not be. Far from creating 
circumstances in which Japan could further advance political 
and economic interests, Japan's possession of nuclear 
weapons would serve only to put Japan in an extremely 
awkward position. 
First and foremost, it is because a nuclear-armed Japan 
could not help but become a target of widespread criticism, 
being strongly repelled by foreign states. With regard to 
nuclear proliferation, there is general agreement that a 
world in which the management of nuclear weapons is kept in 
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as few hands as possible is a much safer world than one in 
which nuclear weapons are managed by many states.27 
Controlling the spread of nuclear weapons has been regarded 
as an indispensable goal for most of the leading states, 
with efforts to stem the proliferation of nuclear weapons 
achieving a major success with the conclusion ' of the 
multilateral arms control agreement of the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty.28 
Though the overly optimistic view by leading nuclear 
states at a time when the Treaty could have effectively 
prevented nuclear proliferation was crushed, owing to 
India's tpeaceful nuclear explosion' of 1974, the nuclear 
non-proliferation policy has been continuously pursued by 
leading nuclear 
collaboration. 29 
states centering on Soviet-American 
A case involving South Africa suggests 
that these powerful states are cooperating with one another 
as far as the goal of nuclear non-proliferation is 
concerned. In August 1977, it was reported that Soviet 
satellites had detected a tower and facilities, in the 
Kalahari Desert, which 
preparations for testing a 
observations were later 
demonstrated South 
nuclear device. 
confirmed by 
African 
These 
American 
reconnaissance. Four months later, under pressure from both 
the superpowers and leading Western European states, South 
Africa stopped work on the site.30 When taking the firm 
policy of the leading states into consideration, any newly 
nuclear-armed state could not but outrage a number of 
states. 
92 
It must, however, be recognised that Japan's nuclear 
armament could not be equated with that of India and other 
states regarded as having strong motives for nuclear 
armament such as Israel, South Africa, Pakistan, Brazil and 
Argentina, some of which may already have nuclear weapons.31 
When considering Japan's advanced technological capability, 
preeminent economic strength and, most importantly, the 
historical fact that Japan used to be a powerful 
militaristic state which overran a number of states in the 
Second World War, there is no doubt that Japan's going 
nuclear would be looked upon very differently from the way 
other non-nuclear armed states would be looked upon if they 
were to go nuclear. Japan should keep in mind that there 
has been the argument, as Tadao Kusumi insists, that Cthe 
purpose of the NPT [by and large], is to put a brake on the 
nuclear armament of the two countries that have the 
technological capacity, West Germany and Japan'.32 Even 
though the world would be terrified of a powerful nuclear-
armed Japan, it is difficult to believe that the world would 
ignore the situation allowing Japan to become a serious 
threat. 
In particular, Japan's going nuclear would be resented 
by every Asian state which suffered greatly from the 
Japanese Empire before 1945. The strong protest by Asian 
states in the 1980s against the so-called CKyokasho Mondai', 
the issue of Japanese high school textbooks, and the 
cYasukuni Sanpai Mondai', concerning official worship at the 
Yasukuni Shrine, clearly suggests that Asian states respond 
to even the slightest signs seeming to reflect the revival 
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of either Japanese militarism or the tGreater East Asia Co-
Prosperity Sphere'.33 
Indeed, it is often argued that most Asian neighbours 
of Japan, especially the ASEAN (Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations) states, seem to want a militarily stronger 
Japan to play a significant role as a countervailing power 
against the Hanoi-Moscow axis.34 Even those who do not want 
Japanese forces to positively playa role in maintaining 
Asian security seem to regard a Japanese military build-up 
as being beneficial for the Asian states, since a militarily 
powerful Japan would enable the United States to commit 
itself more strongly to the security of other Asian states 
by using part of the US forces now used to defend Japan. It 
should be noted, however, that even though it is true that 
some Asian states desire a Japanese military build-up, their 
desire comes with strong strings attached. Tsurutani 
Taketsugu insists: 
Their expectation is that a militarily stronger 
Ja~an play its security role on the basis of two 
pr1ncipal conditions: that it be played within 
the framework of its security relations with the 
United States and that the concomitant military 
build-up be undertaken in regular consultation 
with its friends in the region.35 
It is likely that the Asian states have never expected Japan 
to expand its military . power 1n such a way that it could 
achieve autonomous defence. It is because they fear that 
Japan, by acquiring an autonomous defence capability, might 
behave arbitrarily as it did in the past. 
How would a nuclear-armed Japan look to these states 
still harbouring suspicions about it? There is little doubt 
that Japan's going nuclear, even under US approval, would be 
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regarded as proof that Japan intended to acquire an 
independent defence capability and possibly pursue 
Imperialist ambitions again. As a result, it is likely that 
political and economic relations through various channels 
such as resources procurement, marketing . and investment 
between Japan and other Asian states would be jeopardised.36 
In particular, the most serious consequence of Japan's 
nuclear armament would be the influence exerted on the 
Chinese political position. Although China not only 
recognises the need for the Japanese Self-Defence Forces and 
the Japan-US Security Treaty and also encourages an increase 
in Japan's defence efforts, it would fundamentally change 
its current policy if Japan were to go nuclear. Paul Keal 
points out that: 
The Chinese attitude to Japan could change quickly 
if Japan ever looked as if it might move toward 
the acquisition of nuclear weapons or a 
substantial conventional offensive capability. 
Equally the situation which obtains at present 
would be transformed by a comprehensive 
rapprochement between China and the Soviet 
Union.37 
If this were the case, Japan would undoubtedly be threatened 
by two heavily nuclear-armed Communist neighbours. Further, 
a Sino-Soviet rapprochement would have far-reaching 
consequences concerning the positions of other Asian states, 
for it is recognised that China has been perceived as a 
potential threat to most Asian states, especially Malaysia, 
Indonesia, South Korea and Taiwan.38 For Asian states, the 
revival of the Sino-Soviet axis or the Sino-Soviet-Hanoi 
axis would be a nightmare. Were any of this to occur, how 
would Asian states behave? 
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It can be assumed that, since the Sino-Soviet axis 
might be regarded as being too strong to be opposed, and 
since a nuclear-armed Japan might be regarded as being much 
more dangerous than the Axis in the long run, some Asian 
states might feel a necessity to draw closer to the Axis. 
Also, strong anti-Communist states having the capability to 
develop nuclear weapons, such as South Korea and Taiwan, 
might go nuclear in order to counter both the Axis and 
Japan. 
Far from being beneficial for Japan, possession of 
nuclear weapons, as instruments for advancing its national 
goals, would bring about serious disadvantages because a 
situation would immediately be created in which it would 
become isolated and threatened by several more potential and 
actual enemies than exist today.39 
Further, even if Japan were actually to utilise its 
nuclear weapons as instruments for tcoercion' and 
tbargaining chips', it is doubtful that Japan's nuclear 
weapons could contribute to achieving its goals. This is 
because an opponent of Japan struggling for national 
interests might be able to easily counter-attack Japan's 
challenge. It must be reiterated that Japan is a state 
which depends 
energy, food, 
obvious that 
is extremely 
depends. If 
economy were 
to a dangerous degree upon foreign states for 
raw materials and markets. Therefore, it is 
Japan, even in possession of nuclear weapons, 
vulnerable to hostility from those on whom it 
an opponent that has strong ties with Japan's 
to attempt to implement a large-scale economic 
sanction in response to a Japanese challenge backed by 
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nuclear weapons, Japan might suffer damage serious enough to 
threaten its survival. The cost to Japan of any attempt 
supported by «force' to win against an opponent would far 
outweigh any political and/or economic benefits. Ishihara's 
insistence that Japan could make an opponent submit to it by 
nuclear force in predicted struggles, especially over 
economic interests, is an illusion. 
The ttop-ranked' opponents against whom Japan would 
have to utilise its nuclear weapons in order to achieve 
economic interests would, ironically, be none other than the 
vital states for Japan, namely the United States and the 
European Community (EC) states. In order to survive, Japan 
cannot avoid either the import of various resources or the 
export of 
goods. 
industrial goods, particularly capital-intensive 
As a result it cannot avoid competing for both 
resources and high value-added goods markets with the 
leading Western industrialised states.40 It is obvious that 
to utilise nuclear weapons as the instruments for «coercion' 
and tbargaining chips' against such vital leading states, 
apart from whether they would be effective, would only lead 
to the disruption of the solidarity of the Western Free 
World as a whole. 
In this sense, Ishihara's argument that Japan's nuclear 
armament could contribute to advancing Japan's economic 
interests and at the same time to the elevation of Western 
security against the East is not only an illusion but 
contradictory. In the long run, if Japan were to utilise 
nuclear weapons in struggles against these states, Japan's 
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security would be much more threatened by the Soviet Union 
because of the reluctance of these states to support Japan. 
On the other hand, if Japan could not utilise nuclear 
weapons as instruments for 'coercion' and as 'bargaining 
chips' in the struggles in which Japan might need them most, 
there would not be any justifiable reason to promote the 
possession of nuclear weapons in order to utilise them as 
such instruments. 
Further, when considering the risk to Japan brought 
about by nuclear possession and the inevitable 
ineffectiveness of such weapons as the instruments for 
'deterrence', 'coercion' and 'bargaining chips', it is hard 
to believe, at least from a foreign states' point of view, 
that Japan's nuclear armament would boost its prestige as 
the tGunji Kagaku Kenkyu-Kai' insists. There is little 
doubt that the outcome of Japan's going nuclear would not 
realise the 'powerful autonomous Japan' which the 'Gunji 
Kagaku Kenkyu-Kai' wants, but instead, merely realise an 
'ostracized Japan'. 
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CONCLUSION 
The answers to the ten questions identified in 
Chapter 1 examining the subject of whether or not 
should go nuclear are summarised as follows (See 
Japan 
Chapter 
1 .2) • 
(i) Because of Japan's dense population, concentrated 
industry and lack of strategic depth, it is highly 
vulnerable to even a limited nuclear attack. Its 
strategic location makes it highly unlikely that 
Japan could avoid involvement in a US-USSR 
conflict. Since it depends heavily upon foreign 
states, not only to keep its gigantic industrial 
economy running but to support its huge population 
as well, Japan is dangerously vulnerable to 
external circumstances over which it has little or 
( i i) 
(iii) 
no control. Finally, there are five powers which 
are directly concerned with Japan's national 
security. Of these, the most influential are the 
United States and the Soviet Union. 
It is both Japan's high degree of dependence upon 
the import of raw materials, particularly crude 
oil and rare metals and the heavily-armed Soviet 
Union that are perceived to be threats to Japan in 
the immediate and foreseeable future. 
The advocates of nuclear weapons for Japan insist 
that since the Soviet ICBM force poses a serious 
threat to the US, the credibility of US extended 
(iv) 
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deterrence as a guarantee of Japan's security is 
extremely low. Further, they insist that the 
deployment of the SS-20s, the current military 
build-up in Northern Territories and the powerful 
Soviet Pacific Fleet, pose a direct threat to 
Japan. 
It is often argued that nuclear weapons can be 
used as instruments for enhancing perceived 
national interests of a state, having in turn, the 
functions of tdeterrence', t coerc ion' , 
tbargaining' and tprestige'. It should, however, 
be stressed that whether the utility of nuclear 
weapons is effective or not depends upon the 
circumstances in which they are used. 
(v),(vi),(vii) One of the most decisive factors which could 
influence Japan's decision to go nuclear is the 
Japanese suspicion of the credibility of the US 
security guarantee coupled with the perception of 
an increasing Soviet threat. Under these 
circumstances Japan might attempt to acqu1re 
autonomous defence capability through nuclear 
arms, aiming to deter the Soviet Union without 
depending upon external powers and at the same 
time, boosting its prestige as a militarily 
independent state. 
(viii) 
(ix) 
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The perceptions of the Soviet threat by Japanese 
tmilitary expansionists' are not plausible since 
the Soviet forces in the region can neither 
necessarily be characterised as offensive or 
aggressive, nor can the US forces in the region be 
regarded as inferior to those of the Soviet's; it 
can be concluded that there is not enough of a 
serious Soviet threat to Japan's security to 
justify its large-scale rearmament - much less 
nuclear armament. 
The acquisition of nuclear weapons by Japan, far 
from protecting and/or advancing Japan's perceived 
political and economic interests, would serve only 
to increase crises involving Japan and to place it 
in an extremely awkward position in international 
society. 
(x) There is little doubt that Japan's going nuclear 
would lead to readjustments of alliance in such a 
way that not only would China seek for 
rapprochement between itself and the Soviet Union, 
but also a number of other Asian states would draw 
closer to the newly established Communist bloc or 
attempt to go nuclear in order to counter both the 
Communist bloc and nuclear-armed Japan. Thus it 
is highly likely that Japan's nuclear armament 
would create the circumstances in which Western 
security would be much more threatened by the 
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stronger Eastern block than it is today and as a 
result, the security environment of the Asia-
Pacific region would drastically destabilise. 
The analysis concerning the key question in this paper 
of whether or not Japan should go nuclear clearly leads to 
the conclusion that its going nuclear would be none other 
than an act of folly from every point of view. 
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